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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two parts. The unifying scheme is to advance our under-
standing of the nature of financial markets, in particular their macroeconomic impli-
cations. In the first essay, I focus on the microstructure of the financial market. In
particular, I study how investors’ information choices interact over time, and how does
this dynamic aspect change the nature of information acquisition in financial markets?
In an infinite-horizon framework in which a stock’s dividend has a persistent component
(stock fundamental), and overlapping generations of investors choose whether to acquire
costly information about this time-varying component, I illustrate that information is
like bubble in that its value is forward-looking: current investors have more incentives
to acquire information if more investors get informed in the future, as the future resale
stock price becomes more sensitive to the fundamental. This dynamic complementarity
in information acquisition leads to multiple stationary rational-expectation equilibria,
despite presence of the classic static substitutability force as in [1]. The dynamic com-
plementarity in information acquisition can be most prominent with intermediate per-
sistence of stock fundamental, or when the public signal is imprecise.
The second essay develops and quantifies a financial theory to account for the macroe-
conomic phenomenon that the recovery from the Great Recession was much slower than
recoveries from other postwar recessions . I propose a standard neoclassical model en-
riched with a land sector. Land can be used either as a consumption good for the
household or as collateral for the firm to finance working capital. The model exhibits
two locally stable steady states: one with high capital and high land price, and the
other with low capital and low land price. The multiplicity of steady states allows for
asymmetric responses to small and large shocks. Large adverse shocks have a much
more persistent impact, as they trigger transitions from one steady state to the other.
A calibrated version of the model displays significantly delayed recovery upon large
adverse shocks and is consistent with various features of the Great Recession and its
aftermath.
iii
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Complementarity In
Information Acquisition
1.1 Introduction
A common explanation for why investors trade in stock markets is that they have
access to different information. To motivate heterogeneity in information, it is typically
assumed that information is costly to acquire, so that some investors acquire information
whereas others do not. This raises interesting questions about information transmission
and trading. In particular, how do investors’ information acquisition decisions interact
with each other? Is information a complement or a substitute? [1], in a static model,
provide a classical view to this question: the fact that privately acquired information is
partially revealed through prices means that the larger the share of informed investors
today, the smaller the return to information acquisition. Thus, information is a static
substitute in that its value decreases with the share of informed investors today. This
substitutability in information acquisition leads to a unique equilibrium in [1]. Following
[1], the literature predominantly assumes that agents are allowed to acquire information
only at the beginning of the economy. What if this assumption is relaxed and dynamic
information acquisition is allowed? In particular, how do investors’ information choices
interact over time? How does this dynamic aspect change the nature of information
acquisition in financial markets?
This paper fills the gap by endogenizing information choice in an otherwise standard
1
2infinite-horizon asymmetric information trading model.1 There is a single long-lived
stock that pays a dividend each period. The dividend is stochastic and consists of a
persistent component (the stock fundamental) and a noisy component. The stock’s sup-
ply also follows some persistent process. There are overlapping generations of investors.
Members of each generation, upon their birth, freely observe the entire history of stock
prices and dividends. They are then offered an opportunity to become informed, i.e. to
observe the history of stock fundamental at some cost.
What determines investors’ incentive to acquire information in this dynamic environ-
ment? First, the classic static substitutability in information acquisition still presents
as investors can freely observe current and past stock prices that partially reveal in-
formation. Second, there is a dynamic complementarity force emerging in this infinite-
horizon overlapping-generation framework, making the value of information forward
looking. That is, the value of information today is increasing in the share of informed
investors in the future. This is because as more investors get informed in the future,
future resale stock prices become more sensitive to the fundamental. This increases the
conditional variance of future stock payoff and thus creates more uncertainty for to-
day’s uninformed agents (because they cannot perfectly observe today’s fundamental).
This raises the value of becoming informed today. Like a bubble, this forward-looking
self-fulfilling prophecy opens the door to multiplicity in information acquisition in an
infinite-horizon framework.
My first main result is that this dynamic complementarity may dominate static
substitutability and lead to multiplicity in information acquisition. The intuition is
as follows. In this dynamic environment, multiple stationary equilibrium arise if the
conditional variance of the stock payoff, and thus the value of information, is increasing
in the steady-state share of the informed investors. Now consider a marginal increase
in the steady-state share of the informed. This has two opposing effects on the value
of information. First, there are more informed investors today. Thus, the current stock
price becomes a more precise signal about the fundamental. This tends to reduce the
conditional variance of stock payoffs faced by the uninformed and thus the value of
information. This is the classical static substitutability effect. The magnitude of this
1 The physical and information structure is very close to [2], [3], and more recently, [4], except that
here the information choice is endogenous.
3effect is proportional to the loading of the stock price on the fundamental.2 Second,
there are more informed investors in the future. This makes the future resale stock
price more sensitive to the fundamental and thus increases the conditional variance of
stock payoffs. This is the dynamic complementarity effect. The magnitude of this effect
is roughly proportional to the loading of the future stock payoff on the fundamental.3
Since the stock payoff consists of both the interim dividend payout and the future
resale stock price and thus is more sensitive to the fundamental than just the stock
price, the dynamic complementarity effect dominates the static substitutability effect,
implying an upward-sloping value of information with respect to the steady-state share
of informed investors, leading to multiplicity.
It is well known that infinite horizon, overlapping generation models of this type
have multiple financial market equilibria when information acquisition is exogenous
[5, 6, 3, 7]. To focus on my point, in the main text of the paper I select high-volatility
equilibria and within the equilibria I prove that multiplicity in information acquisition
exists. The multiplcity result persists to low-volatility equilibria.
My second main contribution is to explore conditions under which the dynamic
complementarity, and hence multiplicity in information acquisition prevails. The flexible
framework proposed here allows me to examine a wide range of parameters including
the persistence of stock fundamental, the persistence of stock supply, and the precision
of public signal. It also allows me to examine how the nature of financial market
equilibrium shapes the dynamic complementarity in information acquisition. To this
end, I confirm some existing findings in the literature [8],4 as well as offering new
insights.
Surprisingly, the paper find that there exists a nontrivial relationship between the
persistence of stock fundamental and the strength of dynamic complementarity. This
relationship also depends on which financial market equilibrium one selects: at the high-
volatility equilibrium, higher fundamental persistence always strengthens the dynamic
complementarity; whereas at the low-volatility equilibrium the inverse might be true,
2 Roughly, this is because the variance of the price signal is proportional to the square of the loading
coefficients on the fundamental of the current stock price.
3 Similar to footnote 2, this is because the variance of the stock payoff is proportional to the square
of the loading coefficients on the fundamental of the stock payoffs.
4 For instance, similar to [8], here the complementarity in information acquisition are more prominent
when the stock supply is less persistent.
4and there may exist a U-shaped relationship where the dynamic complementarity is most
prominent with intermediate level of stock fundamental persistence. When stock fun-
damental becomes more persistent, there are two opposing effects. First, current stock
fundamental becomes more predictive of future stock fundamental. This strengthens the
dynamic complementarity. Second, there is a dynamic market learning effect whereby
increasing the fraction of future informed investors makes future uninformed investors
trade more actively on their noisy signals, because they observe a more precise, albietly
still noisy, price signal. This introduces more uncertainty faced by the current informed
and hence reduce the current value of information. The dynamic market learning effect
weakens the dynamic complementarity in information acquisition. Note that this effect
diminishes at the high-volatility equilibrium where the conditional variance of future
stock payoff is already extremely high. Thus, adding more uncertainty does not change
much the overall level of conditional variance.
The paper also finds that multiplicity is less likely to arise when the precision of
the public signal improves. Thus, for a regulator aiming to stabilize asset markets,
disclosing more precise public information is helpful as it helps eliminate equilibrium
multiplicity in information acquisition. This result contributes to the recent debate on
the desirability of the regulatory effort to provide more precise public information, such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, more recently, the Dodd-Frank Act.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the model economy. Section
1.3 describes the formal steps of the proof. Section 1.4 provides intuition for the main
step of the proof. Section 1.5 conducts comparative statics excercises. Section 1.6
concludes.
Literature Review The dynamic complementarity in information acquisition is
reminiscent in previous works such as [9] and more recently [8]. They study finite-horizon
trading models with a pre-trade information acquisition stage and find that multiple
equilibrium in information acquisition can arise. A crucial feature of these works is
that, although the financial market is dynamic, the information market remains static.
And it is not clear whether incorporating dynamic information acquisition would still
preserve multiplicity. 5 This paper illustrates that dynamic information acquisition
5 In a previous version of the paper, [10], I show that a finite-horizon repetition of [1] economy has
a unique equilibrium, despite that both the financial market and information market are dynamic.
5works like bubble: self-fulfilling beliefs about future generations’ information choice
arising in an infinite-horizon framework seem critical in generating multiplicity.
Moreover, this paper explores how economic primitives affects the dynamic comple-
mentarity and offers new implications. In particular, it finds that there is a nontrivial
relationship between the persistence of stock fundamental and the strength of dynamic
complementarity. This has not been explored in previous works which assume that the
stock fundamental is time-invariant. There are also interesting interactions between the
financial market equilibrium and information market equilibrium: at the high-volatility
financial market equilibrium, higher fundamental persistence always strengthens the dy-
namic complementarity; whereas at the low-volatility financial market equilibrium the
inverse might be true, and there may exist a U-shaped relationship where the dynamic
complementarity is most prominent with intermediate level of fundamental persistence.
The theory is also related to the literature that studies exogenous asymmetric infor-
mation trading models in an infinite horizon, pioneered by [11, 2] and [12]. It is partic-
ularly related to models that study overlapping generations of investors [5, 6, 3, 7, 4]6 .
Although the physical structure of my paper is very close to these papers, in my model
the information acquisition choice is endogenous. [13] study a dynamic overlapping-
generations model with private information where, similar to this paper, a dynamic
informational linkage is present: information gets incorporated into the price only if
informed traders expect future traders to also impound their information in the price.
Unlike this paper, however, it does not concern the issue of multiplicity.7
1.2 Model Economy
Time is discrete and runs from −∞ to +∞. The economy is populated by a continuum
of overlapping generations risk-averse agents who consume a single consumption good.
The good is treated as the numeraire. There are two assets in the economy: a bond in
perfect elastic supply, paying a return R;8 and a stock that pays a dividend
Dt = Ft + ε
D
t (1.1)
6 This literature identifies high volatility equilibria and low volatility equilibria with different stock
price sensitivity with respect to noise trader risks.
7 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
8 Alternatively one can interpret the bond as a storage technology without nonnegative constraint.
6each period. Ft is the persistent component of the dividend process. Later I call Ft the
stock fundamental. The stock fundamental follows an AR(1) process:
Ft = ρ
FFt−1 + εFt , 0 ≤ ρF ≤ 1. (1.2)
The stock supply, xt, follows an AR(1) process as well:
xt = ρ
xxt−1 + εxt , 0 ≤ ρx ≤ 1. (1.3)
As in [2], I assume that there is a public signal every period about the current
fundamental:
St = Ft + ε
S
t . (1.4)
The shock vector εt = [ε
D
t , ε
F
t , ε
x
t , ε
S
t ] is i.i.d. over time, with mean 0 and covariance
matrix diag(σ2D, σ
2
F , σ
2
x, σ
2
S).
Investors live for two periods. When they are born, they are endowed with a certain
amount of wealth and also observe the entire history of the dividend and stock price.
They are then offered an opportunity to acquire information at some cost χ. If they
choose to acquire information, they also observe the history of the stock fundamental.
I call investors who choose to acquire information the ”informed” investors and the rest
”uninformed.” The information set of the generation-t uninformed is
ΩUt = {Ps, Ds, Ss}ts=−∞,
and that for the informed is
ΩIt = {Ps, Ds, Ss, Fs}ts=−∞.
As is standard in this class of models, an informed investor, observing the history of the
fundamental and stock price, can perfectly deduce the stock supply. For uninformed
investors, their conditional expectations are derived from Kalman filter equations. We
use Fˆ and xˆ to denote the conditional mean of the current fundamental and stock supply
for the uninformed:
Fˆt = E(Ft|ΩUt ) (1.5)
xˆt = E(xt|ΩUt ). (1.6)
7After the information acquisition stage, the financial market opens and trade occurs.
After that, old investors exit and consume their wealth. The timeline is summarized in
figure 1.1.
The individual agents’ problem is as follows. First, they make their information
acquisition choice:
V = max{V I , V U},
where V I denotes the expected utility of generation-t informed investors, and V U de-
notes the expected utility for the generation-t uninformed. V I and V U are in turn
determined by agents’ portfolio choice:
V i =
∫
P V
i(P )dH1(P )
V i(P ) = maxe,b,c′
∫
P ′,F ′,ε′ U(c
′)dH2(P ′, F ′, ε′|Ωi)
eP + b ≤ w−1{i = I}χ
c′ ≤ (D(F ′, ε′) + P ′)e+Rb,
where U(c) = − exp(−αc), α is the risk-averse parameter. D(F, ε) = F + εD, H1, H2 are
determined in general equilibrium.
1.2.1 Equilibrium Definition
As is standard in the literature, I will focus on the stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1.2.1 Denote s = {Fˆ,F, x}. A steady state is {P (s), λ, {ei(s), bi(s)}i=U,I} s.t.
1. ei(s), bi(s) solves the uninformed and informed agents’ problem given P (s).
2. The market clears: λeI(s) + (1− λ)eU (s) = x(s),∀st, t .
3. VU = VI if λ ∈ (0, 1); if λ = 0, VU ≥ VI ; if λ = 1, VU ≤ VI ,
where Fˆ is the conditional expectation given by equation 1.5. The last condition guarantees
that agents’ information choice is optimal. For instance, if there is a positive fraction of both
informed and uninformed investors (λ ∈ (0, 1)), it has to be the case that the expected utility
of the informed and the expected utility of the uninformed are equalized.
It is challenging to solve a noisy rational expectations Model with general, potentially non-
linear, price functions. Hence, in later analysis, I accord with the literature and restrict my
attention to the class of linear equilibrium. I conjecture that the price function takes the fol-
lowing form:
8Definition 1.2.2 A linear equilibrium is a steady state where price functions are linear with
respect to their arguments. That is, there exists {a, pFˆ , pF , px} such that
P (s) = a+ pFˆ Fˆ + pFF − pxx. (1.7)
Except as otherwise noted, in later sections I will restrict attention to linear equilibrium.
1.3 Multiplicity in Information Acquisition
The purpose of this section is to formally establish that there is multiplicity in information
acquisition in this economy (theorem 1). To do so, I take the following steps:
1. First define steady states where information (i.e. the fraction of informed investors λ) is
exogenous. Denote it as the exogenous-information steady state Φ(λ) (definition 1.3.1).
2. At each Φ(λ) compute the difference in the expected utility of the informed and the
expected utility of the uninformed. Denote it as the value of information pi(λ) (definition
1.3.2).
3. If pi(λ) is equal to some measure of the utility cost of acquiring information (unless at
boundary), Φ(λ) is a steady state (lemma 1.3.2).
4. If there are multiple values of λ, we find multiple steady states (lemma 1.3.3 and theorem
1).
Step 1: Define the exogenous-information steady state Φ(λ)
Intuitively, the auxiliary concept of the exogenous-information steady state is just a steady
state where all generations of investors’ information are exogenously fixed, as studied in [5], [3],
and [7]:
Definition 1.3.1 An exogenous-information steady state given λ is Φ(λ) = {P (s), λ, {si(s), bi(s}i=U,I}
such that it satisfies condition 1 and 2 in definition 1.2.1.
As is well known in this literature, there exists multiple exogenous-information linear steady
states given any λ. To make the exposition transparent, I will focus on the high-volatility
equilibrium in the main part of the analysis9 . Note that I do not take a stand on which
equilibria one should select, as both low-volatility and high-volatility equilibria have desirable
properties. The purpose of focusing on the high-volatility equilibrium is to illustrate that there
is a new source of multiplicity associated with agents’ information choice.
9 The insight obtained in the main part of the paper carries over to low-volatility equilibria as well,
as shown in the robustness check section.
9One may wonder about the existence of the exogenous-information steady state. As in [5],
I provide conditions such that there exists a unique exogenous-information steady state at least
locally near λ = 0.
Assumption 1
(
R− ρx)2 − 4α2σ2x
(1 + ρF
R− ρF (θ2 + θ3)
)2 [(
ρ
F
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
+
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ2
)2
σ
2
D +
(
ρF
R− ρF θ3
)2
σ
2
S
 > 0,
where Σ0 is given by A.26, θ2 is given by A.28, and θ3 is given by A.29.
Lemma 1.3.1 Under assumption 1, a high-volatility exogenous-information steady state Φ(λ)
exists and is unique for λ sufficiently close to 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
In later analysis, I assume that assumption 1 holds.
Step 2: Define the value of information pi(λ)
The value of information is the ratio of the expected utilities of the informed and uninformed
net of information cost at each high-volatility exogenous-information steady state indexed by
λ.
Definition 1.3.2 Denote the expected utility of the informed W I and uninformed WU at each
Φ(λ). Define the following
pi(λ) = WU/W I ,
where W i, i = I, U are given by
W i =
∫
P
W i(P )dFt(P )
W i(P ) = maxe,b,c′
∫
P ′,F ′,ε′ U(c
′)dH(P ′, F ′, ε′|Ωi)
eP + b ≤ w
c′ ≤ (D(F ′, ε′) + P ′)e+Rb.
Step 3: Compare the value of information pi(λ) with some measure of the in-
formation cost The next lemma shows that the value of information function pi(λ) allows us
to directly compare the expected gain from acquiring information with the cost of acquiring
information and determine whether φ(λ) is a steady state.
Lemma 1.3.2 ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), Φ(λ) is a steady state if and only if
pi(λ) = exp(αRχ).
For λ = 0 (1), Φ(λ) is a steady state if and only if
pi(λ) ≤ (≥) exp(αRχ).
10
Proof. Choose the case λ ∈ (0, 1). Verifying the other cases is similar. It can be shown that
under Constant absolute risk aversion utility, V U = WU ; V I = W IeαRχ. Thus, if pi(λ) = eαRχ
holds, then
V U
V I
=
WU
WUeαRχ
=
pi(λ)
eαRχ
= 1.
Thus all of the conditions for a steady state hold for Φ(λ), and Φ(λ) is a steady state.
Step 4: Prove multiplicity
The goal of the last step is to show that (under some conditions) there exists multiple values
of λ satisfying the conditions stated in lemma 1.3.2.
To do so, let me state the following lemma:
Lemma 1.3.3 Suppose
(1− θ0)ρF > ρx + φ (1.8)
for some θ0 ∈ [0, 1] given by A.30 and φ given by ??, then
dpi(λ)
dλ
> 0 for λ sufficiently small.
θ0, ρ
F , ρx, φ are either structural parameters or functions of the structural parameters. the
lemma says that under certain conditions (which we will elaborate in the next section), the
incentive of people to become informed, pi(λ), increases as there are more informed investors.
This is in sharp contrast with the classical substitution effect in [1].
The next theorem establishes the multiplicity result:
Theorem 1 Under condition 1.8, there exits χ such that multiple steady states exist.
Proof. The proof follows from the intermediate value theorem and lemma 1.3.3. The value
of information function pi(λ) is differentiable, and hence continuous. Given that pi′(λ) > 0 for
λ sufficiently small, choose χ such that eαχ = pi(λ1) for some λ1 sufficiently small but strictly
positive. Then we know that λ1 is a steady state. Also, we know that pi(0) < pi(λ1) = e
αχ.
Thus, we know that λ0 = 0 is another steady state because no one is informed and the gain
from acquiring information is less than the cost. Thus there are at least two steady states (see
figure 1.2).
1.4 Intuition and a Heuristic Proof of Lemma 1.3.3
The key step toward multiplicity is lemma 1.3.3. A rigorous proof is delegated to the appendix.
This section is devoted to explaining the main steps and intuition for why the value of information
is locally increasing (pi′(λ) > 0) for sufficiently small λ.
11
To begin, as in [1], the value of information is given by the ratio of the stock payoff uncer-
tainty faced by the uninformed and informed. More precisely, the value of information is given
by
pi =
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI) ,
where D′ is the next period dividend and P ′ is the next period stock price.
In this heuristic proof, instead of focusing on the ratio of uncertainty, we proxy the value
of information with the difference in the conditional variance of the stock payoffs between the
uninformed and informed:
∆V := V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )− V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI).
To derive an expression for ∆V , plug equation 1.1 and equation 1.7 into the stock payoff D′+P ′:
D′ + P ′ = F ′ + ε′D︸ ︷︷ ︸
D′
+ a+ pFˆ Fˆ
′ + pFF ′ − pxx′︸ ︷︷ ︸
P ′
= a+ (1 + pF )F
′ + pFˆ Fˆ
′ − pxx′ + ε′D. (1.9)
Then plug in the law of motion of F ′ (equation 1.2), the law of motion of x′ (equation 1.3), and
the law of motion of Fˆ ′ (equation A.5). Then rearranging, one obtains
D′ + P ′ = a+ (1 + pF )F ′ + pFˆ Fˆ
′ − pxx′ + ε′D
= a+ e1Fˆ + e2xˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
common knowledge
+ e3F − e4x︸ ︷︷ ︸
known to the informed
+ e5ε
F ′ − e6εx′ + e7εD′ + e8εS′︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock
, (1.10)
where coefficients ei are given in A.6 through A.13 and are all positive. Fˆ = E(F |ΩU ) and
xˆ = E(x|ΩU ) are the uninformed’s estimate of the current period fundamental and the stock
supply respectively. As shown in expression 2.9, we can decompose the equation into three
components. The first component, a+ e1Fˆ + e2xˆ, is common knowledge. The third component,
e5ε
F ′−e6εx′+e7εD′+e8εS′, consists of future shocks that no one could possibly know today. The
second component, however, is only known to the informed. Thus, the difference in uncertainty
between informed and uninformed is just the conditional volatility of the second component:
∆V = V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )− V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
= V ar(e3F − e4x|ΩU )
= e23V ar(F |ΩU ) + e24V ar(x|ΩU )− 2e3e4Cov(F, x|ΩU ). (1.11)
The first two variance terms reflect, respectively, the predictive role of the fundamental and
supply. The last term is negative, reflecting the fact that conditional on observing the current
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stock price, fundamental and supply are correlated and the bigger the correlation, the lower the
value of information. Taking derivatives with respect to each term, we have
∂∆V
∂λ
=
∂e23V ar(F |ΩU )
∂λ
+
∂e24V ar(x|ΩU )
∂λ
− ∂2e3e4Cov(F, x|Ω
U )
∂λ
. (1.12)
Thus, whether ∆V is locally increasing in λ depends on three terms. Next I will examine
the value of each term, taking λ very close to zero.
1.4.1 The predictive role of fundamental F
The first term ∂e23V ar(F |ΩU )/∂λ in equation 1.12 reflects how perturbations in λ affect the
value of information through the predictive role of fundamental F . When the share of informed,
λ, increases, two opposing forces affect the value of e23V ar(F |ΩU ). On the one hand, there is
classic substitutability: that there are more informed investors today implies a more informative
current stock price. Thus, the conditional variance of fundamental V ar(F |ΩU ) is reduced. On
the other hand, since there are more informed investors in the future, the future stock price
loads more heavily on the fundamental, and thus the loading coefficient e3 increases.
To compare the two forces, the crucial observation is that classical substitutability is absent
when λ→ 0. More precisely:
lim
λ→0
∂V ar(F |ΩU )
∂λ
= 0. (1.13)
This is due to the nature of the Kalman filter: V ar(F |ΩU ) depends on pF and px only to the
extent that it depends on (
pF
px
)2. This implies that the derivative of V ar(F |ΩU ) with respect
to λ is proportional to pFpx . Also note that when λ→ 0, pF → 0 because there are no informed
investors that knows perfectly the value of F . Therefore,
∂V ar(F |ΩU )
∂λ
∝ pF
px
→ 0 when λ→ 0.
Thus, perturbing λ near λ = 0 does not affect the conditional uncertainty about the current
fundamental faced by the uninformed.
On the other hand, the loading coefficient e23 is strictly increasing in λ. To see this, we need
to derive an expression for e3. For simplicity, ignore the law of motion for Fˆ
′ and just plug in
the law of motion for F ′ and x′ into equation 2.9:
D′ + P ′ = a+ (1 + pF )F ′ + pFˆ Fˆ
′ − pxx′ + ε′D
= a+ (1 + pF )(ρ
FF + εF ′)− px(ρxx+ εx′) + pFˆ Fˆ ′
= a+ (1 + pF )ρ
FF − pxρxx+ pFˆ Fˆ ′ + (1 + pF )εF ′ − pxεx′.
(1.14)
Thus, e3 and e4 are approximately
e3 ≈ ρF (1 + pF ) (1.15)
e4 ≈ ρxpx. (1.16)
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As λ → 0, the loading of stock price on the fundamental, pF , converges to 0, but the loading
of the stock payoffs on the fundamental, e3, converges to some strictly positive number ρ
F .
This is because of the presence of the interim dividend payout, which introduces additional
sensitivity into the future stock payoff compared with the current stock price (see the second
term in equation 1.9). Thus, the derivative of e23 with respect to λ is proportional to 2e3, which
in turn is roughly equal to 2ρF (1 + pF ) which converges to some strictly positive number when
λ is sufficiently small:
∂e23
∂λ
> 0 when λ→ 0. (1.17)
Combining the static substitutability (equation 1.13) and the dynamic complementarity (equa-
tion 1.17), one can show that the first term in equation 1.12 is always positive at the limit:
lim
λ→0
∂[e23V ar(F |ΩU )]
∂λ
= lim
λ→0
∂e23
∂λ︸︷︷︸
>0
V ar(F |ΩU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamic complementarity>0
+ lim
λ→0
∂V ar(F |ΩU )
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
e23
︸ ︷︷ ︸
static substitutability=0
> 0
1.4.2 The predictive role of supply x
The second term ∂e24V ar(x|ΩU )/∂λ in equation 1.12 captures the predictive role of supply x.
As discussed in [8], the equilibrium price becomes a noisier signal of supply when there are more
informed investors. This force tends to increase the conditional supply uncertainty faced by the
agents and thus increase the value of information. More precisely, one can show that
V ar(x|ΩU ) = (pF
px
)2V ar(F |ΩU ).
As λ increases, the stock price becomes more sensitive to the fundamental, and thus the ratio
pF
px
increases. This tends to push up the conditional uncertainty of supply and thus increases
the value of acquiring information and leads to multiplicity.
In this model, however, this effect is absent locally around λ = 0. Again, this result follows
from the nature of the Kalman filter: like V ar(F |ΩU ), V ar(x|ΩU ) is also an (implicit) function
of (pFpx )
2. Thus the derivative of V ar(x|ΩU ) with respect to λ is proportional to pFpx . As a result,
it tends toward zero as λ tends toward zero:
∂V ar(x|ΩU )
∂λ
∝ pF
px
→ 0, as λ→ 0.
In fact, one can further strengthen the statement by observing that when λ→ 0, the stock
price becomes a perfect signal of supply. This implies that there is no uncertainty about the
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stock supply locally around λ = 0. That is limλ→0 V ar(x|ΩU ) = 0. To sum up
lim
λ→0
∂[e24V ar(x|ΩU )]
∂λ
= lim
λ→0
∂e24
∂λ
V ar(x|ΩU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ lim
λ→0
∂V ar(x|ΩU )
∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
e24
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0 (1.18)
Thus, in this model, the supply channel does not play any role locally around λ = 0. This is
different from the work by [8] that emphasizes the supply channel. We can safely ignore this
term henceforth.
1.4.3 Correlation between the fundamental and supply as an offsetting force
The third term −∂e3e4Cov(F, x|ΩU )/∂λ in equation 1.12 reflects the fact that an increase in λ
may reduce the value of information through the correlation channel. The logic is as follows.
When λ increases from zero to some strictly positive increment, the price becomes a noisier
signal of stock supply. This increases the standard deviation of the stock supply relative to that
of the stock fundamental and thus the conditional correlation between the fundamental and
supply. When the correlation increases, information about the fundamental is not that valuable
because any signal that predicts a good fundamental also predicts a large stock supply. The two
forces cancel out each other, making the signal less useful in predicting the future stock payoff.
To derive the sign of ∂∆V∂λ , we need to compare the third term with the first term (recall that
the second term vanishes as λ tends to zero). The rough intuition is the following. As can be
seen in equation 1.15, the loading of the future stock payoffs on the current fundamental, e3, is
proportional to ρF . Thus, e23 is proportional to (ρ
F )2. When taking derivatives in equation 1.12,
we can factor out the constants and thus the first term, ∂e23V ar(F |ΩU )/∂λ, is proportional to
(ρF )2. Similarly, the third term,−∂e3e4Cov(F, x|ΩU )/∂λ, is proportional to ρF ρx. Therefore,
roughly speaking, for the first term to dominate the third term we need (ρF )2 to be greater than
ρF ρx, or equivalently, ρF greater than ρx.
When the exact formulas of e3 and e4 are plugged in, one can formally show that when
λ→ 0,
∂∆V
∂λ
> 0 ⇐⇒ (1− θ0)ρF > ρx, (1.19)
where the expression of θ0 is given in A.30 and is always between 0 and 1. Thus, for ∆V to be
locally increasing in λ, it is necessary that the fundamental is sufficiently more persistent than
supply.
The 1 − θ0 term measures the information advantage of the informed at λ = 010 . It is
always nonnegative because informed investors are always at a (weak) information advantage
10 Formally, it captures how sensitive informed agents’ estimate of the fundamental is with respect
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relative to the uninformed. The presence of 1 − θ0 in condition 1.19 says that multiplicity is
more likely to arise when the information advantage of the informed is larger. The intuition is as
follows. Whether multiplicity arises depends on the strength of the dynamic complementarity, or
how much more sensitive the future stock price would become with respect to the fundamental
upon a marginal increase in λ. When the information advantage of the informed is very large,
the informed’s demand is much more sensitive to the fundamental than the uninformed. Thus,
a marginal increase in the share of the informed tomorrow makes tomorrow’s aggregate demand,
and hence tomorrow’s stock price, much more sensitive to the fundamental. This implies that
the dynamic complementarity is stronger, and thus multiplicity is more likely to arise.
So far we have used ∆V as a proxy for the value of information and illustrate a necessary and
sufficient condition for multiplicity to arise (condition 1.19). In the rigorous proof, there is an
additional term φ in condition 1.8. This φ term captures the level effect of changing λ. Namely,
perturbing λ changes not only the difference in uncertainty but also the level of uncertainty.
This has a nontrivial effect on the value of information. To see this,
pi =
√
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩU )
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
=
√
1 + V ar(D
′+P ′|ΩU )−V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
=
√
1 + ∆V
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI) .
(1.20)
Thus, the value of information is a monotonic function of ∆V
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI) . Not only the
difference but also the level of uncertainty V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI) enter into the expression of pi and
matter. The term φ is complicated and hard to characterize analytically. Yet, as shown in figure
1.3, where I numerically solve and plot the parameter pair (ρF , ρx) that satisfies condition 1.8,
the general insight that the fundamental should be more persistent carries over.
1.5 Comparative Statics
So far we have illustrated that for the multiplicity in information acquisition to arise, it is
crucial that the fundamental is more persistent than supply. This section investigates how other
parameters, (σ2F , σ
2
D, σ
2
x, R, α) and most crucially σ
2
S , affect the multiplicity result.
to the true fundamental relative to the uninformed’s:
1− θ0 = lim
λ→0
∂[E(F |ΩI)− E(F |ΩU )]
∂F
.
16
As shown in figure 1.4, increasing the precision of the public signal shrinks the multiplicity
region. This result can be understood as follows. As discussed before, 1 − θ0 captures the
information advantage of the informed. When the public signal becomes more precise, this in-
formation advantage vanishes. This makes condition 1.8 harder to satisfy. Thus, the multiplicity
region shrinks.
This result provides an interesting perspective on recent policy attempts to provide more
precise public information. It says, for a regulator seeking to stabilize asset prices, it is desirable
to disclose more precise public information because it helps to eliminate equilibrium multiplicity.
Other comparative statics exercises are collected in figure 1.5. All the results can be under-
stood by examining how these parameters affect the value of θ0 and hence condition 1.19. First,
reducing the dividend noise σ2D shrinks the multiplicity region, since the dividend becomes a
more precise signal of the fundamental and therefore θ0 increases. Likewise, a decrease of σ
2
F
reduces prior uncertainty and therefore makes uninformed agents rely less upon dividend infor-
mation. This reduces the sensitivity parameter θ0. Thus, the multiplicity region expands. Last,
varying σ2x hardly affects the multiplicity region because the price signal contains pure noise
when there are no informed agents. Therefore, price signals drop out of uninformed agents’
Bayesian updating problem for the fundamental (although it is still useful in predicting future
supply). Thus, varying σ2x does not change the value of θ0. Thus, the multiplicity region hardly
changes.11 Similarly, risk averse coefficient α and interest rate parameter R do not affect
multiplicity region, because they do not enter into the expression of θ0.
Low Volatility Equilibria
In the main part of the paper, I focus on high-volatility equilibria to illustrate the multiplicity
in information acquisition. This is convenient because the φ term becomes very small with
high-volatility equilibria.12 This section checks whether the main results of the paper extend
to the low-volatility equilibria. The answer is yes. To illustrate, I set the parameters to
the benchmark level and plot the multiplicity region corresponding to high- and low-volatility
equilibria, respectively. As can be seen in figure 1.6, the multiplicity region (surrounded by
dashed green lines) shrinks with low-volatility equilibria. Note that the multiplicity region
displays backward bending with low-volatility equilibrium, due to the level effect captured by
the φ term in condition 1.8. Specifically, it is possible that an increase in the share of the
informed induces an increase in the loading of the equilibrium price on supply px, which leads to
11 Varying σ2x does affect the multiplicity region through the feasibility condition (equation 1). This
effect is present only when the volatility parameters are set large. This case is checked in the robustness
check section.
12 To understand this, note that φ is proportional to 1/V U . In the high-volatility equilibrium,
V U = V ar(P ′ +D′|ΩU ) is generally very big. Thus, φ ≈ 0.
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higher uncertainty and thus, by equation 1.20, lower value of information. When the persistence
parameter ρF gets bigger, this level effect becomes more powerful due to a stronger dynamic
linkage.
Large volatility parameters
In the main part of the paper, the volatility parameters are set to be small (σ2F = σ
2
D = σ
2
x =
σ2S = 0.01). Small volatility is convenient because the feasibility constraint (assumption 1) never
binds for any feasible (ρF , ρx) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. This section shows what the multiplicity region
looks like when the volatility parameters are set to be large.
When the volatility parameters are set to be large, the feasibility constraint (assumption
1) kicks in, which affects the multiplicity region. However, the general conclusion that the
fundamental needs to be more persistent than supply for multiplicity to arise is robust. To
illustrate, I set volatility parameters to 10 one by one and plot the resulting new multiplicity
region (figure 1.7). The multiplicity region is surrounded by a red dashed line. The feasibility
constraint becomes most stringent when σ2F and σ
2
x are set to be large. This is in line with
the literature studying overlapping-generations asymmetric information trading models, which
typically set σ2x to be a very small number.
Last, it is natural to ask how robust the multiplicity result is when agents live for more
than two periods. This question, however, cannot be addressed within the current framework
because when agents live for more than two periods, their incentives to acquire information
depends on the conditional mean of stock fundamental. The conditional mean, however, is
affected by random shocks (see equation A.5). This in turn implies that agents’ incentives
to acquire information become functions of random shocks, as do the price coefficients. With
random price coefficients, the equilibrium price is no longer normally distributed. This breaks
down the classic linear-normal framework and calls for an alternative approach.13
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies implications of dynamic information acquisition in an otherwise standard
infinite-horizon asymmetric information trading model. It is shown that multiplicity in infor-
mation acquisition could arise in such an environment. This finding is due to the dynamic
complementarity in information acquisition: current investors have more incentive to become
informed if more investors are informed in the future. The dynamic complementarity dominates
13 [8] studies information acquisition with long-lived agents. There information market only opens
at the beginning of the economy. Crucially, the prior mean is normalized to be zero. Thus, the model
remains tractable.
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classical static substitutability ([1]) and leads to multiplicity. The interim dividend payout is
important because it introduces additional sensitivity with respect to the fundamental into the
future stock payoff compared with the current stock price. It is also crucial that the funda-
mental is more persistent than the stock supply.14 The model has some other implications.
For example, multiplicity in information acquisition becomes less likely to arise when the public
signal becomes more precise. This suggests that for a regulator seeking to stabilize asset prices,
disclosing more precise public information is beneficial because it helps to eliminate equilibrium
multiplicity.
14 [2] and [3] set the persistence parameters to be equal. [4] and [7] choose the fundamental to be
more persistent than supply.
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𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
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𝑡𝑜 𝑡 − 1 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑛.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline
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The blue curve depicts numerically solved pi(λ). The black dashed line depicts the
information cost. Red dots are numerically solved steady states. Parameter values:
α = 1, R = 1.05, ρF = 1, ρx = 0, σ2F = 0.01, σ
2
D = 0.1, σ
2
x = 0.01.
Figure 1.2: The value of information pi(λ)
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This figure plots the parameter subspace (ρx, ρF ) where condition 1.8 is satisfied (the area surrounded
by the blue curve), and hence multiplicity in information acquisition could arise.
Parameter values: R = 1.05, α = 1, σ2F = σ
2
D = σ
2
x = σ
2
S = 0.01
Figure 1.3: Multiplicity Region
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This figure plots how the multiplicity region changes when σ2s decreases from 0.01 to 0.005. The blue
area plots the benchmark case whereas the red dashed area plots the case where σ2s = 0.005.
Figure 1.4: Comparative Statics: σ2s = 0.01→ 0.005
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Panels 2-4 plot how the multiplicity region changes when σ2D, σ
2
F , and σ
2
x change from
0.01 to 0.005, respectively. The blue area is the benchmark case. The red areas in
panels 2,3 and 4 are the new multiplicity regions when the volatility parameters are set
to 0.005.
Figure 1.5: Comparative Statics
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The figure plots the multiplicity region under the benchmark parameter values σ2F = σ
2
D = σ
2
x = 0.001.
The blue area depicts the multiplicity region with high-volatility equilibria. whereas the dashed green area
depicts the multiplicity region with low-volatility equilibria.
Figure 1.6: Robustness Check II: Low-volatility equilibria
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Panels 2-4 plots how the multiplicity region changes when σ2D, σ
2
F , and σ
2
x change from 0.001 to 10
respectively. The blue area in panel 1 is the benchmark case where σ2F = σ
2
D = σ
2
x = 0.001. The red
area is the new multiplicity region after, say, σ2F is changed to 50. In panels 2 through 4, all areas to
the right of the grey dashed curves violate assumption 1 and are thus infeasible.
Figure 1.7: Robustness Check I: large volatility parameters
Chapter 2
Land Prices, Collateral
Constraints and Secular
Stagnation
2.1 Introduction
The Great Recession from 2007-2009 differs considerably from other postwar recessions. First,
declines in major macroeconomic variables were huge relative to other postwar recessions. Sec-
ond, the recovery has been much slower. As shown in Figure 2.1, following an average postwar
recession, major macroeconomic variables fully recovered in five years. Yet, the impact of the
Great Recession seemed to be much more persistent: GDP and housing price kept declining
relative to their respective trends; Labor barely recovered; Investment recovered somewhat but
was still 20 percent below trend after five years.1
The Great Recession resembles other historical crises such as the Great Depression and
Japan’s 1990 crisis. Both were severe crises, and were followed by slow recoveries. This suggests
a relationship between the size of the economic downturn and recovery speed. Why do severe
crises tend to be followed by slow recoveries? This paper proposes and quantifies a theory to
account for this pattern.
so
1 It has been argued that the huge drop of housing price during the recession is largely corrections
to the pre-recession housing price boom. Yet despite the pre-recession acceleration, there were still big
declines in housing prices relative to its trend after the Great Recession (see Figure B.1 for housing
price and Figure B.2 for land price constructed following [14]).
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The general view of this paper is that the economy has multiple regimes, or locally stable
steady states: a positive one with high levels of capital and high land prices, and a negative
one with low levels of capital and low land prices. Given multiple isolated steady states, the
economy’s responses to small and large shocks are different: Small shocks induce local fluctua-
tions around steady states, whereas large shocks trigger transitions between steady states, thus
exerting a persistent impact on the economy.
The central piece of the theory is interactions between the households and the firms through
the land sector. Specifically, I consider an otherwise standard neoclassical model with a land2
sector in which land serves dual roles. On the one hand, land serves as consumption for
households. On the other, it can serve as collateral for firms to finance their borrowing, in
particular their working capital. In practice, it is common for firms to use their balance sheet
assets as collateral to finance their borrowing, including their working capital (See [15, 16]). An
important form of collateral assets for U.S. firms is real estate. According to the Flow of Funds,
in 2010 real-estate assets made around 50 percent of the nonfinancial assets and 25 percent of
the total assets for U.S. nonfinancial corporates. For nonfinancial noncorporates, more than 90
percent of their nonfinancial assets were real-estate.3
In this environment, I prove that the law of motion for capital is S-shaped, with possibly
multiple locally stable steady states: a “good” one, with high levels of capital and high land
prices, and a “bad” one, with low levels of capital and low land prices. The logic is summarized
in Figure 2.2. At the good steady state, land prices are high. This implies that firms’ working
capital constraints are slack, which enhances their employment capacity. As labor and capital
are complementary in production, firms have large incentives to invest, which leads to high
levels of capital. High levels of capital and high levels of labor together imply high household
consumption, and thus strong household demand for land, as the shadow value of wealth is low.
This confirms the high land prices in the first place. At the bad steady state, however, land
prices are depressed. The low land prices tighten firms’ working capital constraints, constraining
their employment capacity and their incentives to invest as well. As a result, steady-state levels
of capital are low, as is household demand for land, which confirms the initial depressed housing
prices.
With multiple locally stable steady states, the model features asymmetric recovery speeds
upon shocks of different sizes. Large adverse shocks have a much more persistent impact, as
they trigger transitions from one steady state to the other.
The key assumption for multiple steady states to exist is a sufficiently low intratemporal elas-
ticity of substitution between housing and consumption, or equivalently that consumption and
2 In this paper with slight abuse of language I will use ”housing” and ”land” interchangeably.
3 See Federal Reserve Board Z.1 Release, table B.103 and B.104 for nonfinancial corporates and
non-corporates respectively.
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housing are quite complementary. With low elasticity of substitution, procyclical fluctuations in
(nonhousing) consumption expenditures bring about large procyclical fluctuations in aggregate
housing prices. The highly volatile housing prices impact the aggregate economy through firms
credit constraint, delivering extremely persistent responses upon large transitory shocks. This
is in contrast to typical macro models with financial frictions that fail to generate high volatil-
ity of asset prices and thus fail to generate strong amplification and persistence quantitatively
([17, 18]).
In the quantitative section of the paper, I calibrate the model to the US economy and
quantitatively evaluate the persistence property of the model. To do so, I first calibrate a series
of temporary financial shocks to match the observed drop in housing prices since 2007. I then
feed this shock, together with the productivity shock from [19] into the model and evaluate how
much persistence the model generates. The model is able to generate a slow recovery comparable
to the US experience after 2010, and did particularly well in matching the slow recovery of labor.
Moreover, it is also able to replicate the sharp and persistent rise of the labor wedge, in particular
of its firm component.4
In terms of model predictions, as collateral constraints and land price dynamics play central
propagation roles in my theory, my model predicts that financial crises with real-estate price
busts tend to be followed by slow recoveries. A series of recent empirical papers (e.g. [21], [22],
[23]) studying historical cross-country evidence suggest that this is the case. One of their general
findings is that historically financial crises are associated with plummeted asset prices (real-estate
prices in particular) and are followed by slow recoveries in various macroeconomic variables such
as output and labor. In terms of cross-sectional evidence regarding the current recession, [24]
documents, using MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) level data, that the recovery of local
labor market is slower in MSAs with larger housing price declines during the crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out a baseline model where I prove the
main theoretical result of the paper that multiple locally stable steady states exist. Section 2.3
enriches the baseline model with more realistic features and takes it to the data. Section 2.4
concludes.
Literature Review
It is the first paper, to my knowledge, which illustrates that collateral constraints not only
amplify shocks, but also generate multiple steady states in a unique equilibrium. Thus it con-
tributes to the vast literature of macro models with collateral constraints, initiated by [25]. [25]
considers a model where land serves both as a factor of production and collateral for the firm to
4 Labor wedge is defined as the log distance between the marginal product of labor and the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor. The firm component of the labor wedge is defined,
as in [20], the log distance between the marginal production of labor, and the real wage.
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finance their investment expenditure. They find that collateral constraints amplify and propa-
gate productivity shocks (and even lead to local indeterminacy5 ) around a unique steady state.
Recent papers, such as [15], [16], [26], and []lwz, extend the original [25] framework in various
dimensions. Still, all of these papers feature a unique steady state. In this paper, I incorporate
two ingredients, working capital and the consumption role of land, into a canonical macro model
with collateral constraints and find that steady-state multiplicity arises. Note that each of the
two ingredients alone has already been considered in the literature. And it is the first paper
that combines the two elements and systematically investigates its implications.
Specifically, works by [15] and [16] incorporate working capital into macro models with
collateral constraints but ignore the consumption role of land. They consider environments
in which firms finance their working capital on top of investment expenditures, assuming that
physical capital is the only form of asset owned by the firms. Papers by [26] and []lwz consider the
consumption role of land, but ignore the working capital aspect.6 They propose environments
in which firms accumulate both physical capital and real-estate assets. Real-estate assets are
different from physical capital as they can serve either as consumption goods for households, in
addition to as collateral (and a production factor) for the firm. This paper combines elements
from both strands of literature and reach a novel conclusion: that multiple locally stable steady
states arise.
In addition, the paper is related to the literature that studies the relationship between fi-
nancial frictions and agents’ overborrowing behavior in small open economies (for example [28]
and [29]). [30] and [31] demonstrate that collateral constraints introduce aggregate nonconvex-
ities that lead to multiple equilibria under certain parameterizations. Unlike this literature,
which focuses exclusively on small open economies without capital accumulation, the focus of
this paper is on closed production economies with capital accumulation. Moreover, my model
features multiple steady states but a unique equilibrium. Thus there is no room in my model
for equilibrium multiplicity or sunspots. This is desirable as it frees me from the problem of
equilibrium selection.
The paper is also related to an early literature that studies the relationship between capital
market imperfections and persistence of initial wealth distribution . [32] illustrates that with
non-convex production technology and credit rationing, multiple steady states associated with
different distributions of wealth exist. Unlike [32], my mechanism does not rely on a non-
convex production technology. [33] illustrates that endogenous interest rate interacts with wealth
distribution and leads to multiple steady states when credit rationing presents. Here my result
does not rely on the dynamics of interest rate. Moreover, [33]’s primary interest is in long-run
5 See footnote 16, [25]. Also see [18].
6 [27] incorporates working capital requirement as one of their sensitivity checks and they do not
characterize conditions under which multiple steady states arise.
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growth. Thus it is built on the Solow growth model where households saving behavior is treated
exogenously7 . My model, in contrast, is built on a standard neoclassical growth model where
households saving behavior is forward looking and determined in equilibrium. This makes my
framework more suitable for business cycle analysis, which is the focus of this paper.
The paper is also related to the fast-growing literature that views the slow recovery from
the Great Recession as a transition between different “regimes,” or steady states. [34] shows
that perfect real wage rigidity leads to the existence of a continuum of steady states indexed by
capital level. [35] uses global game techniques to show that aggregate demand externalities lead
to the existence of multiple locally stable steady states. There are two important differences.
First, my mechanism is distinct from theirs: it does not rely on sticky wage or aggregate demand
externalities. Second, my model delivers unique predictions: it accounts for the post-recession
pattern of the labor wedge. [35] successfully delivers rise in the efficiency wedge but has nothing
to say about labor wedge. [34] delivers a sharp rose in the labor wedge, but the rise is entirely
due to the “households component,” namely, the rise of the wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the real wage. My model predicts that both the “households component” and
the “firm component” of the labor wedge rised persistently after the Great Recession, in line
with the data.8
From an empirical point of view, the paper is related to the empirical literature that estimates
the value of the elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption. The empirical
literature has reached little consensus on the magnitude of this parameter. On the one hand,
studies based on macro-level data frequently find a value greater than unity ([36] and []mms).
On the other hand, studies based on micro-level data typically find a value between 0.1 and 0.6
([38], [16], [39], and []ll). In the quantitative section of this paper, I calibrate this parameter
to the middle of the micro studies. I view the results obtained in this paper as an illustration
of the importance of this parameter in the macro-finance literature, and therefore urge more
research in this area to identify a more precise range for this parameter.
2.2 Theory
This section describes a stylized model that illustrates the mechanism in the simplest possible
environment. Time is discrete and runs to infinity. The commodity space consists of a numeraire
7 Specifically, [33] assumes that every period households save an exogenous fraction of their total
income.
8 The households component is the difference bewteen the labor wedge and its firm component. [20]
argues that historically, most of the variations in labor wedge come from the households component.
This is not true in the recent recession, where there is also a large and persistent spike in the firm
component.
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consumption good, physical capital, labor, and “land”, where land is a good in fixed supply, can
be enjoyed by households, and serves as collateral for the firm. The economy is closed, in the
sense that all prices, including the interest rate, are endogenously determined.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived, identical household-entrepreneurs.
In every period, they choose how much to consume and how much to invest in physical capital,
land, and bonds. They also choose, as households, how much labor to supply to the market and,
as entrepreneurs, how much labor to demand from the market. The flow budget constraint is
given by:
ct + ptht + bt + kt ≤ wtlt + pit + ptht−1 + qtbt+1 + (1− δ)kt−1 (2.1)
where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes land holdings, pt denotes the price of land, bt
denotes bonds and qt denotes the price of bond, kt denotes the level of capital, lt denotes labor
supplied and wt denotes the wage level. pit denotes profit earned by the firm:
pit = max
ldt
A(ldt )
1−αkαt−1 − wtldt (2.2)
Similar to [16] and [15], I assume that there is a cash flow mismatch, such that part of the
wage bills must be paid in advance of production. Thus, households need to borrow intraperiod
loans to finance the wage bill. The total amount of borrowing, including interperiod loans and
intraperiod loans, cannot exceed some fraction of the market value of the collateral owned by
the households, which consists of housing and capital. This gives us the following borrowing
constraint:
qtbt+1 + θwtl
d
t ≤ ξptht + κkt (2.3)
Compared to [16] and [15], the novel ingredient here is that land can be used as collateral
to finance firm borrowing (including working capital).
Formally, the households’ problem can be written as following:
max
c,h,l,ld,k
∞∑
t=1
βtU(ct, lt, ht) (HH)
Subject to:
ct + ptht + bt + kt ≤ wtlt + pit + ptht−1 + qtbt+1 + (1− δ)kt−1 (2.4)
pit = max
ldt
A(ldt )
1−αkαt−1 − wtldt (2.5)
qtbt+1 + θwtl
d
t ≤ ξptht + κkt (2.6)
0 ≤ lt ≤ l0, ct, ht, kt ≥ 0, h0, k0 given
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The preference is a variation of the standard GHH preference that incorporates taste for
housing:
U(c, l, h) =
(
c− χ l
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
)1−σ
1− σ + ω
h1−σ
1− σ (2.7)
Two comments are in order. First, as a standard GHH preference, there is no wealth effect.9
Second, the key parameter, σ, is both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the (inverse
of) intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing and nonhousing consumption. The
intertemporal substitution does not matter at all for the result. Intratemporal elasticity is the
crucial parameter that determines the strength of the mechanism.10
2.2.1 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, bonds, and land are all clear. The goods market
clearing condition is:
ct + kt = Ak
α
t−1l
1−α
t + (1− δ)kt−1
Labor market clearing implies that households’ supply is equal to firm demand of labor
lt = l
d
t
As the aggregate supply of bonds is zero and all agents are homogeneous, bond market clearing
implies:
bt = 0
This is different from typical models with financial frictions that focus on intertemporal borrow-
ing. Here, intertemporal borrowing is always zero in equilibrium. The model therefore highlights
9 One could assume an alternative GHH formulation, as in [41]:[[
c1−1/η + ωh1−1/η
]1/(1−1/η)
− χ l
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
]1−σ
1− σ
Unfortunately, this formulation does not completely get rid of the wealth effect as consumption still
enters into the households labor supply first order condition.
10 Alternatively, one could consider a preference that seperates the intertemporal and intratemporal
substitution by assuming a CES form with respect to composite consumption and housing:[[
(c− χ l
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
)1−1/η + ωh1−1/η
]1/(1−1/η)]1−σ
1− σ
The multiplicity result still holds in this environment. Thus, without loss of generality, I consider the
simple case where η = 1/σ and this formulation collapses to 2.7.
32
the role intraperiod borrowing plays. One can extend the framework in various ways so that
there is equilibrium intertemporal borrowing, but at the cost of model complexity.
Finally, land is in fixed supply h0, and therefore land market clearing implies:
ht = h0
By the Warlas Law, we only require that labor, bond, and land markets clear and that goods
market clearing follows.
The definition of equilibrium is standard: Agents optimize and markets clear.
Definition 2.2.1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {ct, kt+1, ht+1, lt, ldt , bt}∞t=1
and a sequence of prices {pt, wt, qt}∞t=1 such that:
1. Given prices, allocations solve the households problem HH.
2. Housing, bond, and labor markets clear every period: h = h0, b = 0, l = l
d
A steady state is a competitive equilibrium where the capital stock kt is time-invariant.
2.2.2 Steady-State Multiplicity
The purpose of this section is to formally establish that there exist multiple locally stable steady
states under appropriate assumptions.
Theorem 2 Suppose σ and ν are sufficiently big. Then there exists an open set U ∈ R2 such
that for any combinations of loan to value ratios (κ, ξ) ∈ U , there exists more than one locally-
stable steady states.
Proof. See appendix.
The theorem says that if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (big
σ) and the Frisch elastity of substitution is sufficiently high (big ν), then multiple steady states
arise. The formal proof takes two steps. First, I need to prove that there exists multiple steady
states and second prove that these steady states are locally stable. The formal proof is delegated
to the appendix. here I present a heuristic proof.
There are five steady state equations characterizing the steady state variables: capital,
consumption, wage, labor, and land price (k, c, w, l, p).
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)1−α + (1− δ) +
(
(1− α)Akα (l)−α
w
− 1
)
κ
]
= 1 (Capital FOC)
The first equation, Capital FOC, is the intertemporal first-order condition of capital. Com-
pared to the first-order condition of capital arising from a standard neoclassical model, there is
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a novel term,
(
(1−α)Akα(l)−α
w − 1
)
. This term captures the fact that accumulating capital helps
to relax borrowing constraints whenever they are binding. To see this, note that the numerator,
(1−α)Akα (l)−α, is the marginal product of labor, and the denominator is the real wage. When
the borrowing constraint is slack, the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage, and this
term vanishes. This term only shows up when borrowing constraints are binding, and thus there
is a positive wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage.
l
1
ν = w (Labor Supply)
min
(
ξph0 + κk
w
,
(
(1− α)A
w
) 1
α
k
)
= l (Labor Demand)
Equation Labor Supply and Labor Demand characterize the labor supply decision of the house-
holds and the labor demand decision of the firm respectively. Note that the wealth effect is
absent in equation Labor Supply : households labor supply is only determined by wage and is
independent of households’ consumption. In equation Labor Demand, firm’s labor demand is
potentially constrained by the total value of assets it owns. Thus, its labor demand is given
by the minimum of its employment capacity determined by collateral value ξph0+κkw , and its
unconstrained labor demand
(
(1−α)A
w
) 1
α
k.
And there is an aggregate Resources Constraint:
c+ δk = Akαl1−α (Resources Constraint)
Finally, there is an intertemporal first-order condition for land:
ωh−σ0 +
(
βp+
(
(1− α)Akα (l)−α
w
− 1
)
ξp
)(
c− χ l
1+ 1ν
1 + 1ν
)−σ
= p
(
c− χ l
1+ 1ν
1 + 1ν
)−σ
(Land FOC)
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of purchasing additional units of land. Its consists
three components. First, there is intrinsic benefit from owning land, as shown in the first term.
Second, one can resell the land tomorrow and get its resell price βp. Third, land could serve
as collateral and relax the borrowing constraints of the firm, as shown in the third term. The
right-hand side is the marginal cost, which is equal to the current price of land. The first-order
condition equates the marginal benefit of land to the marginal cost.
We proceed to characterize the system. To do so, we first observe that Equations Capital
FOC, Labor Supply, Labor Demand, and Resources Constraint define an implicit mapping from
land price p to other equilibrium objects k,w, l, and c. This mapping generally does not have
a closed-form but we can evaluate its derivatives through implicit differentiation. Write this
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mapping heuristically as k(p), w(p), l(p), c(p). Next, we define the following function F which is
the left hand side of Land FOC less its right hand side, divided by the shadow value of wealth(
c− χ l1+
1
ν
1+ 1ν
)−σ
:
F (c, l, w, k, p) := ωh−σ0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1ν
1 + 1ν
)σ
+ βp+
(
(1− α)Akα (l)−α
w
− 1
)
ξp− p (2.8)
Plug the mapping k(p), w(p), l(p), c(p) into function F , we arrive at one equation with one
unknown:
f(p) := F (c(p), l(p), w(p), k(p), p) = ωh
−σ
0
c(p)− χ l(p)1+ 1ν
1 + 1
ν
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic benefit from land
+
(
(1− α)Ak(p)αl(p)−α
w(p)
− 1
)
ξp
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relaxing credit constraint
− (1− β)p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net cost
= 0
I summarize the above observations into the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.1 Equations Capital FOC, Labor Supply, Labor Demand, Resources Constraint
define a mapping p→ (k, l, w, c). {p, k(p), w(p), l(p), c(p)} is a steady state if and only if f(p) = 0
The function f has a natural interpretation. It measures the households’ excess willingness
to pay for an additional unit of land in addition to its net cost. The excess-willingness-to-
pay function f has three components. The first component captures the intrinsic benefit from
owning the land. The second component captures the fact that owning more land helps to relax
the working capital constraint. The last component is the net cost of land, which takes into
account that one can sell the land at price p tomorrow. All components are measured in current
consumption units as the original land first-order condition is divided by the shadow value of
wealth.
In Figure 2.3, I plot a typical function f(p) with certain parameter values. Due to the
nonmonotonicity of f there are multiple crossings with zero axes. Hence, by lemma 2.2.1, there
exist multiple roots to equation f(p) = 0.
What makes function f nonmonotoic with respect to land price p? Note that in a frictionless
environment this cannot arise. Function f would always be decreasing with respect to the land
price p due to the usual price effect: Households are less willing to pay for land as the net cost
of land increases.
Here, in the presence of the working capital constraint this monotonicity property no longer
holds. In particular, there exists a region where households are more willing to buy land when
the land gets more expensive. This is due to a novel general equilibrium effect through the
working capital constraint: When the working capital constraint is binding, an increase in the
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land price increases households consumption. This reduces the shadow value of wealth and
makes households more willing to pay for land. Formally:
Lemma 2.2.2 (With binding working captail constraint, increases in land price raise consump-
tion)
The mapping p→ (k, l, w, c) defined by Equations Capital FOC, Labor Supply, Labor Demand,
Resources Constraint has the following property:
∂c(p)
∂p
≥ 0
The inequality is strict if the working capital constraint is binding:
ξph0 + κk(p)
w(p)
<
(
(1− α)A
w(p)
) 1
α
k(p)
With a binding working capital constraint, an increase in land price p raises consumption
because it raises output. The output boom arises because firms are allowed to hire more workers
with enhanced employment capacity and, with greater incentives to invest, possess higher levels
of steady state capital. The next lemma states that increases in consumption raises households’
willingness to pay for land, holding other equilibrium quantities constant.
Lemma 2.2.3 (Raising consumption raises households’ willingness to pay for land)
∂F
∂c
> 0
Lemma 2.2.3 states that with greater consumption (and also greater composite consump-
tion11 ), the shadow value of wealth,
(
c(p)− χ l(p)1+
1
ν
1+ 1ν
)−σ
, decreases. This increases the value
of function f , the households’ excess willingness to pay for land. Thus, Lemma 2.2.2 and Lemma
2.2.3 collectively form a complete logical chain of the collateral channel: with binding working
capital constraint, increase in land price raises households willingness to pay for land through
increased consumption.
Equation 2.9 provides a decomposition of f :
∂f(p)
∂p
=
∂F (c(p), l(p), w(p), k(p), p)
∂p
=
∂F
∂c︸︷︷︸
>0 By lemma 2.2.3
>0 By lemma 2.2.2︷︸︸︷
∂c
∂p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collteral Channel>0
+
∂F
∂p︸︷︷︸
Usual Price Effect<0
(2.9)
11 One can show that with a sufficiently large Frisch Elasticity ν, increase in land prices not only
increases consumption, but also increases composite consumption.
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To summarize, there are two main opposite forces at work. First, there is a conventional
negative price effect: When land price becomes more expensive, households are less willing to
pay for it. Second, there is a positive collateral effect that is absent from a frictionless model:
With binding working capital constraint, increase in land price raises households willingness to
pay for land through increased consumption (lemma 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 illustrate the logic chain.).
When the collateral effect is strong enough, it overturns the conventional price effect and leads
to an upward sloping willingness to pay function f . This is the source of multiple steady states
in my model.
2.2.3 Discussion of Assumptions
The strength of this collateral channel depends on the intratemporal elasticity parameter σ and
Frisch elasticity of labor ν. The following two propositions illustrate the respective roles of the
two parameters.
Proposition 2.2.1 (Role of Intratemporal Elasticity of substitution σ)
The function F defined by Equation 2.8 has the following property:
∂F 2
∂c∂σ
> 0
The lemma says with bigger σ, changes in consumption c brings about larger changes the
households willingness to pay for land through larger changes in the shadow value of wealth,
holding other equilibrium quantities fixed. This is intuitive. Suppose σ → 0, households become
risk neutral. Then changes in consumption c do not affect the shadow value of wealth, which
is always equal to unity. This breaks down the collateral channel as ∂F∂c would equal to zero.
Thus, for the collateral channel to work, I need a large σ so that the shadow value of wealth is
sensitive to consumption fluctuations.
Proposition 2.2.2 (Role of Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply ν)
The mapping p → (k, l, w, c) defined by Equations Capital FOC, Labor Supply, Labor Demand,
Resources Constraint has the following property:
∂l(p)2
∂p∂ν
> 0,
∂k(p)2
∂p∂ν
> 0,
∂c(p)2
∂p∂ν
> 0
With bigger ν, the substitution effect of labor supply is stronger. This implies that changes
in land price has bigger impact on labor (∂l(p)
2
∂p∂ν > 0), on capital (
∂k(p)2
∂p∂ν > 0), and therefore
on consumption (∂c(p)
2
∂p∂ν > 0). This is intuitive as well. Imagine that ν → 0. Then labor
is approximately inelastically supplied. Thus, equilibrium labor is insensitive to land price
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fluctuations. So is equilibrium consumption. This breaks down the collateral channel as ∂c∂p
would equal to zero.
The dual role of land is crucial for multiple steady states to arise. The following proposition
illustrates this point:
Proposition 2.2.3 (The dual role of land is important for steady-state multiplicity)
When either of the following assumptions hold, f is monotonically decreasing and there exists a
unique steady state:
1. ω → 0 (When the consumption role of land vanishes)
2. ξ → +∞ (When the collateral role of land vanishes)
When the land taste parameter ω tends to 0, households do not enjoy land as consumption.
This implies consumption fluctuations become irrelevant for land price fluctuations. This in
turn weakens the collateral channel and leads to a unique steady state. When the loan-to-value
ratio ξ tends to infinity, credit constraints no longer bind. The weakened collateral role of land
undermines the collateral channel, leading to a unique steady state as well.
Finally, I briefly discuss the technical steps of the proof. To show that there exist multiple
steady states, one must show that there exists three points p1 < p2 < p3 such that f(p1) >
0, f(p2) < 0, f(p3) > 0. This, coupled with the continuity of f(p), implies that there are multiple
steady states. To show that there exists such p1, p2, p3, we need to take the following steps (figure
B.3):
1. Solve the unique frictionless steady state (steady state in an economy without working
capital constraints). Denote the steady state (css, kss, pss, wss, lss).
2. If κ is sufficiently small, define ξss =
wsslss−κkss
pssh0
. Show that given ξss, there exists multiple
nontrivial steady states: (See the red curve of figure B.3)
(a) f(0; ξss) > 0
(b) f(pss; ξss) = 0 and f
′−(pss), where f ′− denotes the left derivative of f ;
3. Show that the case extends to ξ ∈ (ξss, ξ0] for some ξ0.
Having established that there exists multiple steady states, we next proceed to examine their
local stability. A formal proof is given in the appendix. Here we heuristically argue that, the
biggest and the smallest steady states in figure 2.3 are locally stable whereas the middle one
is unstable. To see why, focus on the smallest steady state, call it p0. Perturb it downwards
to p0 − δ. One can see that f(p0 − δ) > 0 as f is downward sloping locally around p0. Thus
households are willing to pay more for land, pushing the land price upward. Similarlly if the
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land price is perturbed upwards, households willingness to pay would drop, pushing the land
price back to p0. Thus, p0 is locally stable. The logic holds for the biggest steady state and is
reversed for the middle steady state. Of course, to prove local stability, one need to write donw
the dynamic system and examine the eigenvalues of the transition matrix, similar to []slp. We
delegate all the formal proofs to the appendix.
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2.3 Extended Model and Quantitative Analysis
The model in section 2.2 is stylized, and serves the purpose of illustrating the mechanism and
highlighting the required assumptions. To summarize, I demonstrated that the steady-state
multiplicity arises if 1) the housing and nonhousing consumption are not very substitutable;
and 2) the substitution effect on labor supply is strong.
To keep the theoretical result clean and transparent, the stylized model imposes some re-
strictions on model structure. For instance, there is no distinction between residential land and
commercial land. All land is owned by the representative households-entrepreneur. Moreover,
the housing rental market is assumed away, which is a nontrivial proportion of the housing
market. Finally, land does not have a productive role.
In view of this, I take on two tasks in this section. First, I propose an extended model in
which 1) there is a distinction between residential and commercial land; 2) there is a housing
rental market; and 3) land can serves as a factor of production, as in [27] and [26]. Despite
richer ingredients, the extended model behaves ”very similar” to the stylized model in the sense
that an equivalence result can be proved: that the equilibrium allocations and prices in the
extended model are the same as those in the stylized model under empirically plausible parameter
restrictions. Second, I conduct a quantitative analysis whereby I calibrate the extended model
to the US economy and ask the following questions: Does the steady-state multiplicity result
still survive? How much persistence can the model generate quantitatively? In particular, is the
model able to account for the slow recovery after the Great Recession?
2.3.1 An Extended Model
The economy is populated by two types of agents: a continuum of households and a continnum
of firms. The households maximize their lifetime utility
∑∞
t=1 β
tU(ct, lt, ht), where ct is con-
sumption, lt is labor, ht is the amount of land enjoyed by the households, which consists of land
owned by them hht and land rented by them h
r
ht. Households are the owners (shareholders) of
the firms. The household’s budget constraint is:
ct + pthht + rth
r
ht−1 ≤ ptlht−1 + dt + wtlt (2.10)
where rt is the rental rate of land and dt is the dividend paid out by the firm.
The households problem is to maximize their lifetime utility subject to their budget con-
straint Equation 2.10 and given the initial land holding hh0:
max
∞∑
t=1
βtU(ct, lt, ht)
ct + pthht + rth
r
ht−1 ≤ ptlht−1 + dt + wtlt
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hh0 given, lt ≤ l¯
I use the following utility function:
U (c, l, h) =
[[
ω(c− χ l1+
1
ν
1+ 1ν
)1−1/σ + (1− ω)h1−1/σ
]1/(1−1/σ)]1−η
1− η (2.11)
Note that this utility function is just an extension of Equation 2.7 where I separate the in-
tertemporal and intratemporal elasticity parameters. Thus I need to introduce an additional
parameter η into the model. Note that when η = 1/σ, Equation 2.11 collapses to Equation 2.7.
The firms maximize the discounted sum of dividends weighted by some pricing kernel, Mt,
which in equilibrium is equal to the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
Their gross revenue function is given by F (k, l, h) = Ak1−α−γ lγhα. Note that land has a
productive role as in [27] and [26]. The elasticity of output with respect to land is captured by
parameter α.
The firms accumulate capital and land. Capital depreciates at rate δ. Land does not
depreciate and can be rented out to households at rate rt. Thus the firms face a tradeoff
between land allocated to productive use and rental use. Their budget constraints are given by:
dt + kt + pthft ≤ F (kt−1, lt, hpft−1) + pthft−1 − wtlt + rthrft + (1− δ)kt−1
hft = h
p
ft + h
r
ft
where hft−1 is firms’ total land holding in the beginning of period t. They can allocate it into
two alternative uses: production hpft−1 and rental h
r
ft−1. As in the stylized model, we assume
that there is a working capital constraint arising from the cash-flow mismatch problem of the
firms:
wtlt ≤ ξ(pthft + kt) (2.12)
The firms maximize weighted discounted dividend subject to budget constraints and working
capital constraints, given an initial holding of captial and land:
max
∞∑
t=1
Mtdt
dt + kt + pthft ≤ F (kt−1, lt, hpft−1) + pthft−1 − wtlt + rthrft + (1− δ)kt−1
hft = h
p
ft + h
r
ft
wtlt ≤ ξ(pthft + kt)
hf0, k0 given
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Note that I impose no restrictions on the behavior of households and firms, in particular how
they accumulate and use land. How much land is owned by the households and by the firms,how
much land is allocated to rental relative to production are all determined in equilibrium.
The definition of competitive equilibrium is standard:
Definition 2.3.1 A competitive equilibrium is {ct, lt, hht, hrht, kt, hft, hrft, dt, hdt }∞t=1 and {pt, wt, rt}∞t=1
such that:
1. Given prices, allocations solve the households problem.
2. Land, labor, and land rental market clears every period: hh + hf = h0, l = l
d, hrh = h
r
f
2.3.2 An Equivalence Result
In this section, we will prove the following equivalence result:
Theorem 3 Suppose the land’s share in production α = 0. Then the equilibrium allocations
(consumption, labor, capital, and investment) and prices in the extended model are the same as
those in the stylized model.
The theorem claims that when the productive role of land is assumed away (α = 0), the
extended model is equivalent to the stylized model in terms of major equilibrium allocations
and prices. What, then, is the empirically plausibe range for α? The general consensus of the
literature is that it is not too much different from zero. [27] and [26], for instance, set this
parameter to 0.03. This, together with the equivalence result, suggests that the dynamics in the
extended model is not too much different from that in the stylized model, and in particular, the
steady-state multiplicity result is likely to survive in the extended model.
The proof amounts to compare the set of first order conditions and resources constraints
across the two models. Before we proceed, the following lemma greatly simplifies the character-
ization of equilibrium in the extended model:
Lemma 2.3.1 There exists an equilibrium in the extended model such that all land is owned
by the firms. Equilibrium allocations (consumption, labor, capital, and investment) and prices
in other equilibria, if any, are the same as those in this equilibrium. If the working capital
constraints bind at any date, this is also the unique equilibrium.
This lemma suggests that it suffices to restrict attention to the equilibrium where all land
is owned by the firm. The intuition is as follows. In the presence of working capital constraints,
it is always weakly socially optimal to allocate land to the firms, as this always weakly relaxes
the credit constraints. Specifically, when the working capital constraints do not bind at any
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future dates, there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed by the distribution of land between
the households and the firms. In each of these equilibria, households are indifferent between
owning or renting a house. These equilibria are equivalent in terms of real allocations. When
the working capital constraints do bind at some future dates, firms are willing to pay additional
money for land, reflecting the additional benefit of relaxing the (future) credit constraints. This
drives households out of the land purchase market and into the rental market. As a result, the
unique equilibrium outcome is that all land is owned by the firm.
We take the first order condition for the households with respect to hrh:
Ucr = Uh (2.13)
where Uc is the partial derivative of utility with respect to consumption and Uh is the partial
derivative of utility with respect to land. This equation says that the benefit (right hand side)
of renting land and enjoy the service flow generated from the land is equal to the rental cost
(left hand side). We can also take the first oder condition for the firms with respect to hf :
M ′p′ + r′M ′ = Mp (2.14)
Where M is the pricing kernal for the firm. And a prime denotes tomorrow’s variable. This
equation says that the current cost of buying land, in equilibrium, should be equal to the future
benefit, including the capital gain of land (first term of left hand side) and the rent (second term
of left hand side). Note that the pricing kernal
M = βtUc (2.15)
Plug Equation 2.15 and 2.13 into Equation 2.14, one arrive at the following equation:
βU ′cp
′ + βUh = Ucp
This is exactly the housing first order condition one would obtain from the stylized model. One
can also check other first order conditions, resources constraints, and credit constraints and
conclude that theorem 3 holds.
2.3.3 Calibration and Computation
In this section I describe the calibration procedure. Most parameters are set to standard values
used in the literature or calibrated using standard targets. Aggregate land supply h0 is nor-
malized to 1, whereas the relative quantity of land owned by the firm h¯f is set to .5, consistent
with [43]. On the household side, the discounted factor β is set to 0.99 as I calibrate the model
to quarterly frequency. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution η is set to 2. The Frisch
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labor elasticity is set to 1, which is in the middle range of micro and macro estimates. The taste
parameter ω is calibrated so that the steady state land price to annual GDP ratio is 1.8. The
distutility of labor parameter χ is calibrated so that steady state labor is equal to one third. On
the production side, productivity A is normalized to 1. Capital share α is set to 0.33 and the
labor share γ is set to 0.64. This implies that the land share in the production function is 0.03,
value estimated by []lwz and [26]. The depreciation rate δ is equal to 0.025.
We are left with three crucial parameters: the intratemporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween housing and nonhousing consumption η, the loan-to-value ratio parameter ξ, and a wage
adjustment procedure in order to have realistic fluctuations in employment.
The literature reaches little consensus on what σ should be. On the one hand, studies based
on macro-level data frequently find a value greater than unity ([36] and []mms). On the other
hand, studies based on micro-level data typically find a value between 0.1 and 0.6 ([38], [16],
[39], and []ll). In this section, I set it to 0.33, in the middle of the micro studies.
Next I need to calibrate the loan-to-value ratio parameter ξ. The standard way of calibrating
occasionally binding credit constraints is to target the frequency of crises, as in [29]. Here, due
to the computation burden, I abstract away from stochastic shocks. Therefore the standard
strategy does not apply here. I develop a strategy analogous to the standard one, where ξ is
calibrated to meet two criterion. First, the working capital constraint does not bind for “mild”
recessions, that is, recessions where output fluctuations are less than 5%, average of postwar
recessions except the Great Recession. Second, the working capital constraint binds for the
Great Recession where outputs drop by 10%. I pick ξ such that the credit constraint just binds
with 8% drop in output, middle of the two criterion. The resulting value for ξ is 0.04.
Finally, I need to incorporate some wage stickiness in order to generate realistic fluctuations
in employment. I assume that the real wage is downward rigid:
wt ≥ ζwt−1 (2.16)
This real wage adjustment constraint can arise, for example, in an environment with nominal
wage rigidity and in which the central bank is reluctant to raise inflation, as in [30]. Here we
do not model the details of a monetary economy, but take the constraint as given. The wage
adjustment parameter ζ is set to ( 11+2% )
1/4 ≈ 0.995. This captures the idea that households
are unwilling to accept nominal wage cuts and the central bank is maintaining a 2% inflation.
To see why, let Wt denote the nominal wage level and Pt denote the nominal price level. Then
real wage is just the ratio of nominal wage and nominal price. As the household is unwilling to
accept nominal wage cuts:
Wt ≥Wt−1
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And the central bank is maintaining 2% inflation annually:
Pt = (1 + 2%)Pt−1
dividing the first equation by the second, one has
wt ≥ 1
1 + 2%
wt−1
Therefore annual adjustment is 11+2% , implying that quarter adjusment is (
1
1+2% )
1/4 ≈ 0.995.
Note that calibrating ζ with 2% annual inflation serves as a conservative benchmark given
that inflation has been low in recent years. If inflation is lower, real wage would display greater
stickiness, strengthening our mechanism. []mary documents that wage growth has been strong
since the recession started, exactly because inflation has been low. Thus our quantitative results
can be thought of as a lower bound on the strength of our mechanism.
Despite no exogenous shocks, computing the recursive competitive equilibrium turns out to
be a nontrivial task, as there are two occasionally binding constraints: equation 2.12 and 2.16.
Moreover, there are two state variables: capital stock and previous-period wage. There are
strong nonlinearities with respect to each state variable, especially with respect to the previous
wage. I implement a version of the policy function iteration modified to account for occasionally
binding constraints. I also consider uneven-spaced grids, placing more grid points around the
region where nonlinearities are more likely to occur. A detailed description of computation
algorithm is given in the Appendix. The resulting Eulor Equation error is on the order of 10−9.
2.3.4 Quantitative Results
Figure 2.4 presents the main quantitative result, that there is asymmetry in recovery speed upon
small and large shocks. The economy recovers immediately after small shocks, but experiences
significant delays upon large shocks. This is in stark contrast to a neoclassical model. For
comparison, I also solve a standard neoclassical model without frictions and plot its impulse
response to shocks of different sizes. For the standard neoclassical model, capital recovers
immediately for both small and big shocks.
To understand the mechanism, figure B.5 plots various equilibrium functions. The crucial
observation is that the law of motion for capital is S-shaped conditional on previous period wages
(the top left panel). As a result, the economy displays asymmetric responses to small and large
shocks. In particular, recovery is delayed upon large shocks. In figure 2.5, I provide a heuristic
description of why recovery is delayed upon large shocks. The response of the economy to small
shocks is identical to a neoclassical model. Suppose the economy operates at the steady state A.
In period 0 there is a mild negative shock such that the capital stock in this economy drops to
point B. In this region land price drops are mild and therefore credit constraints do not bind.
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As a result, the economy immediately recovers—just as a standard neoclassical model would
predict.
When there is a large negative shock at period 0, however, the dynamics are different.
Suppose that a very large negative shock hit the economy in period 0 and the capital stock
drops to point B in period 1. Households wealth drops sharply. Land price falls sharply as
well, both today and in the future. But wage cannot fall too much due to the downward wage
rigidity constraint. This implies sharp drops in labor, both today and in the future. This, in
turn, depresses investment and thus in period 2, the economy’s capital stock drops further to
point B1. In period 2, wage starts falling but is still not sufficient whereas at the same time,
land price is still very depressed. So investment is still low, dragging the economy further down
to point C2 in period 3. Not until period 4 does wage drop to a sufficiently low level such that
employment starts to recover. Thus, with large adverse shocks, the economy experiences delayed
recovery: recovery comes with a few period’s lag.
Why is the model successful in generating significant persistence after large recessions?
It is important to understand the behavior of equilibrium prices. The bottom left panel of
Figure B.5 plots equilibrium land price, which is very sensitive to fluctuations in capital. If
capital is 80% of its unconstrained steady-state level, land price is only 50% of that. On the
other hand, as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure B.5, equilibrium wage is insensitive
to capital fluctuations, due to the downward wage rigidity constraint. The highly sensitive
equilibrium land price function together with the highly insensitive wage function implies that
firm’s borrowing constraint has a quantitatively important impact on the dynamics of labor. As
one can see in the top right panel of Figure B.5, labor drops 30% when capital falls by about
20%.
It is important to understand the separate roles of sticky wage and land price dynamics in
shaping aggregate dynamics. To make the point, I compute an alternative model in which land
prices in the credit constraint is exogenously fixed at p = p¯. More precisely, the credit constraint
is given by:
θwl ≤ ξ(k′ + p¯h′)
In this economy, land price dynamics do not affect agents’ borrowing capacity. I label it
“constant-p” economy. I set p¯ to the unconstrained steady state level pss. Figure 2.7 plots the
policy functions across three economies: the neoclassical economy (black curve), the constant-p
economy (blue curve), and the benchmark economy (red curve). I plot four panels corresponding
to different level of previous-period wage. As one can see, both the constant-p economy and the
benchmark economy exhibit nonlinearities in the policy functions. Thus, both economies are
capable of generating more persistence than the neoclassical economy, upon sufficiently large
negative shocks. The nonlinearity, however, is much stronger in the benchmark economy where
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land prices fluctuations affects borrowing constraints. Interestingly, when wages are relatively
high (top left panel), there is not much difference between the benchmark economy and the
constant-p economy. The difference gets much more substantial when wages are relatively low.
For example, when wage is 5 percent below its steady-state level (bottom right panel), capital
starts to recover in the constant-p economy but still delines in the benchmark economy.
In figure 2.4, I compare the impulse responses upon small and big shocks, in a frictionless
economy, constant-p economy, and the benchmark economy. The right panel plot the impulse
responses of small shocks (such that capital only falls by 1 percent). The transition path is almost
identical across three economies. The right panel plot impulse responses of big shocks. And one
can see delayed recovery both in the constant-p economy and in the benchmark economy. The
delays in the “constant-p” economy are mainly due to the sticky-wage constraint, as in [34].
Delays in the benchmark economy are much more significant, and the additional persistence
arises because of endogenously tightened borrowing constraints.
2.3.5 Accounting for the aftermath of the Great Recession
Now I conduct a simulation of the Great Recession, to evaluate whether the model is able to
generate the slow recovery of major aggregate variables, similar to the data. To do so, I first
calibrate the shocks that I later feed into the model. I consider two sources of shocks. The first
is financial shocks to the loan-to-value ratio ξ. The second is productivity shocks to A. I use
the productivity time series constructed by [19] to calibrate productivity shocks, and calibrate
the financial shock ξ such that the model matches the overall drop in housing prices after 2007,
which is about 35%. The resulting ξ is ploted in Figure B.4.
I feed the two shocks into the model, and Figure 2.8 demonstrates the behavior of various
variables during the recovery phase, which is between 2010 and 2016. The model is broadly
consistent with the behavior of various macro variables in the recovery phase. It does a particu-
larly good job of matching the behavior of labor, and it even over-predicts the slow recovery of
investment compared to the data. Yet, the model under-predicts the recovery speed for output.
This is possibly due to the fact that we use a utilization-adjusted TFP series. If we instead use
an unajusted TFP time series, the decline in TFP would be more salient, and this could further
drag down output.
It would be interesting to see how the credit shock alone contributes to the slow recovery
after the Great Recession. Figure 2.9 plots how variables recover when there is only the credit
shock, labeled “credit shock only”. Relative to the two shocks case, with only credit shock
the model predicts quicker recovery of all four variables. This is expected, as productivity has
gradually declined since 2008. The model still does a good job of matching the behavior of
investment. And it is broadly consistent with the recovery speed for labor, particularly before
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2013. after 2013, the model predicts that the recovery speed of labor picks up. This is largely
due to the wealth effect on labor supply: when the real wage adjust downward, households get
the chance to supply more labor, and they are willing to do so because they are poor. The
quantitative performance is expected to be improved if one use preferences without the wealth
effect such as the GHH preference. I conclude, that the propagation mechanism described here
could play an important role in accounting for the slow recovery after the Great Recession, and
particularly the behavior of labor and investment
Accouting for the labor wedge
There has been a sharp and persistent rise in the labor wedge since the Great Recession. The
labor wedge is defined as the log distance between the marginal production of labor and the
marginal rate of substitution:
labor wedge = log(marginal production of labor)− log(marginal rate of substitution)
. The Great Recession also witnessed a sharp and persistent rise in the firm component of the
labor wedge, defined as the distance between the marginal product of labor and the real wage:
Firm component of labor wedge = log(marginal production of labor)− log(real wage)
As shown in Figure 2.10, my model matches the salient features of the labor wedge and its firm
component after the 2008 recession. The rise of the labor wedge in the model is due to the
sticky wage constraint, which drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the
real wage (households component), and the credit constraint, which drives a wedge between the
real wage and the marginal production of labor (firm component). After the recession, both
constraints binds for an extended period of time, leading to persistent rise in the labor wedge
and its firm component.
2.4 Conclusion
The Great Recession was very different from other postwar recessions, due not only to big
declines during the recession, but also to the slow recovery. This paper aims to advance our
understanding of the Great Recession and its aftermath. I propose and quantify a framework
in which land serves dual roles: either as household consumption or as firm collateral to finance
borrowing, in particular its working capital. Within this framework, the law of motion of capital
is S-shaped, leading to existence of multiple steady states and hence asymmetric responses to
small and large shocks.
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Important future work remains to be done. First, for the sake of clarity, the theory is pre-
sented in an intentionally simple framework with representative agents. It would be interesting
to explore a fully quantitative framework in which heterogeneous agents are present with differ-
ent borrowing capacities, calibrated to resemble the US economy. Second, a crucial parameter
that determinines the strength of the mechanism is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between housing and consumption. Unfortunately, so far the literature has reached little con-
sensus on the magnitude of this parameter. Tightening its empirical range is another line of
important future work.
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Note: This figure plots linearly detrended aggregate variables in the five-year window following the Great
Recession (solid blue curve) and previous recessions (dashed green curve). Previous recessions include
the 2000 recession, the 1990 recession, the 1981 recession, the 1973 recession, and the 1960 recession.
Starting point is normalized to 0. GDP is the real GDP per capita. Investment is the real private gross
investment. Labor is the total hours available from BLS. Housing price is the Case-Shiller real home
price index.
Figure 2.1: The Great Recession Compared to Other Postwar Recessions
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦
𝐵𝑎𝑑 Steady State
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
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Figure 2.2: Multiple Steady States
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This figure plots typical excess-willingness-to-pay-function f . Each crossing with zero
axes is a steady state. Thus there are three steady states. The biggest and the smallest
ones are both locally stable. Parameters value used: β = 0.96, δ = 0.1, σ = 3, α =
0.35, ω = 1, ν = 6, ξ = 0.13, κ = 0
Figure 2.3: Excess-willingness-to-pay-function f(p) and Multiple Steady States
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Transitional dynamics starting from .5% and 5% below the steady state level of capital.
Model dynamics identical to its neoclassical counterpart with mild loss of capital (top
panel), and significant delay in recovery with severe loss of capital (bottom panel).
Figure 2.4: Transitional Dynamics with Different Initial Capital
Output Investment
Year 2011 2013 2015 2011 2013 2015
Data -12.7% -35.5% -49.7% 2.9% 26% 35%
Model -10.7% -18.8% -25.6% -54.4% -90.0% -112%
Labor Land Price
Year 2011 2013 2015 2011 2013 2015
Data 4.9% 15.2% 26.9% -24% -25% 13.9%
Model 5.9% 17.9% 28.0% 3.4% 10% 18.6%
Note: the rate of recovery is defined as the fraction of lost variables recovered relative to the fourth quarter of
2009. For instance, in 2011 4.9% of the lost labor was recovered (bottom left panel). The rate of recovery for
output is negative as detrened output kept declining after the recession. The model did a particularly good job
in matching the behavior of labor. It also predicts the declining post recession output and the pace of recovery
for land price at longer horizon.
Table 2.1: Comparing the Rate of Recovery
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This figure plots typical law of motion for capital and highlights different dynamics upon
small and large shocks. Suppose the economy operates at the usual steady state point
A. After a mild recession, the level of aggregate capital stock drops to point B. Then
it recovers immediately B → B1 → B2.... In contrast, suppose the economy is hit
by a severe negative shock so that its capital stock ends up at point C. Then it will
drop further to C1 and then C2, finally recovery in period 3. Thus, recovery after big
recessions is significantly delayed.
Figure 2.5: Graphical Illustration of Delayed Recovery
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Transitional dynamics starting from .5% and 5% below the steady state level of capital.
For the benchmark model, the dynamics is identical to its neoclassical counterpart with
mild loss of capital (top panel), and there is significant delay in recovery with severe loss
of capital (bottom panel). For the constant-p economy, there is also delays in recovery
compared to its neoclassical counterpart, but the delay is less significant.
Figure 2.6: Transitional Dynamics
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This figure compares policy functions across three models: the standard neoclassical
model.Both the constant-p economy and the benchmark economy exhibit nonlinearities
in the policy functions. The nonlinearity, however, is much stronger in the benchmark
economy compared to the constant-p economy, especially when the previous-period wage
is relatively low.
Figure 2.7: Policy Functions
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This figure presents simulation results and compares them with the data starting in the
year 2010. The data part I use the same time series as in Figure 2.1. For the model
part, I feed in the economy with a series of productivity shocks from [19] and a temporary
credit shock, such that land price drops by 30%.
Figure 2.8: Simulation I
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This figure presents simulation results and compares them with the data. For the data
part I use the same time series as in Figure 2.1. For the model part, I feed in the
economy with a series of productivity shocks from [19] and a temporary credit shock
such that land price drops by 30%. For the case with credit shock only, I only feed in
the credit shocks.
Figure 2.9: Simulation II
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This figure presents simulation results and compares them with the data.
Figure 2.10: Labor Wedge and its Firm Component
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of lemma 1.3.1
I prove existence by construction. Namely, I find a system of equations that fully characterizes
exogenous-information steady states Φ (λ) given any value of λ. The method I use to look for
such a system of equation is very similar to Wang (1994): look for a system of equations of(
Σ, pFˆ , pF , px
)
given λ. Σ is the uninformed’s prior of the state variable (F, x) and is pinned
down by the Kalman filter equations, given pFˆ , pF , px. pFˆ , pF , px are pinned down by the market
clearing condition, given Σ. The detailed proof is as follows.
First, we would like to look for an equation characterizing Σ. The state st evolves and the
signal is given by the following dynamic system:
st+1 = Ast + wt+1, where wt+1˜N (0, Q)
yt+1 = Gst+1 + vt+1, where vt+1˜N (0, R) ,
where
st =
[
Ft
xt
]
yt =

SPt+1
Dt+1
St+1
 =

pFFt+1 − pxxt+1
Ft+1 + ε
D
t+1
Ft+1 + ε
S
t+1

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A =
[
ρF 0
0 ρx
]
G =

pF −px
1 0
1 0

Q =
[
σ2F 0
0 σ2x
]
R =

0 0 0
0 σ2D 0
0 0 σ2S
 .
Apply the formula of the Kalman filter:
sˆt+1 = Asˆt +
[
AΣtA
′G′ +QG′
] [
GAΣtA
′G′ +GQG′ +R
]−1
(yt+1 −GAsˆt) (A.1)
Σt+1 = AΣtA
′ +Q− [AΣtA′G′ +QG′] [GAΣtA′G′ +GQG′ +R]−1 [AΣtA′G′ +QG′]′ .
At a stationary equilibrium, Σ must be stationary over time, and therefore the second
equation becomes
Σ = AΣA′ +Q− [AΣA′G′ +QG′] [GAΣA′G′ +GQG′ +R]−1 [AΣA′G′ +QG′]′ . (A.2)
We arrive at the first equation, which characterizes the uninformed’s conditional expectation
Σ.
Next, we know that investors solve the following problem:
max
e
−E
[
e−αRw−αe(D
′+P ′−RP)|Ωi
]
, i = u, i.
Thus, its demand is given by
Di =
E
[
D′ + P ′|Ωi]−RP
αV ar [D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi] (A.3)
=
E
[
D′ + P ′|Ωi]−RP
αV ar [D′ + P ′|Ωi] ,
where the second equality follows because the current price P is in the information set of both
agents. Note that E
[
D′ + P ′|Ωi] and V ar [D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi] are the conditional mean and
variance of the excess stock return perceived by the agent conditional on its information set Ωi.
We can write out D′ + P ′ :
D′ + P ′ = F ′ + εD′ + a+ pFˆ Fˆ
′ + pFF ′ − pxx′ (A.4)
= a+ (1 + pF )F
′ + pFˆ Fˆ
′ − pxx′ + εD′.
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Note that by the previous Kalman filter expression,
Fˆ
′
= ρ
F
Fˆ +
[
Y1 Y2 Y3
] 
pF
(
F ′ − ρF Fˆ
)
− px
(
x′ − ρxxˆ)
F ′ − ρF Fˆ + εD′
F ′ − ρF Fˆ + εS′
 (A.5)
= ρ
F
Fˆ + Y1
[
pF
(
F
′ − ρF Fˆ
)
− px
(
x
′ − ρxxˆ
)]
+ Y2
[
F
′ − ρF Fˆ + εD′
]
+ Y3
[
F
′ − ρF Fˆ + εS′
]
=
(
ρ
F − Y1pF ρF − (Y2 + Y3) ρF
)
Fˆ + (Y1pF + Y2 + Y3)F
′ − Y1pxx′ + Y1pxρxxˆ + Y2εD′ + Y3εS′,
where
[
Y1 Y2 Y3
]
denotes the first column of matrix
[AΣA′G′ +QG′] [GAΣA′G′ +GQG′ +R]−1 . To ease exposition, define
e1 = pFˆ
(
ρF − Y1pF ρF − (Y2 + Y3) ρF
)
= pFˆ ρ
F (1− Y1pF − Y2 − Y3) (A.6)
e2 = pFˆY1pxρ
x (A.7)
e3 = ρ
F
(
1 + pF + pFˆ (Y1pF + Y2 + Y3)
)
(A.8)
e4 = ρ
x
(
pFˆY1px + px
)
(A.9)
e5 = 1 + pF + pFˆ (Y1pF + Y2 + Y3) (A.10)
e6 = pFˆY1px + px (A.11)
e7 = pFˆY2 + 1 (A.12)
e8 = pFˆY3 (A.13)
(A.14)
Thus,
D′ + P ′ = a+ e1Fˆ + e2xˆ+ e3F − e4x+ e5εF ′ − e6εx′ + e7εD′. (A.15)
We can further simplify this expression by substituting out xˆ :
pFF − pxx = pF Fˆ − pxxˆ
xˆ =
pF
px
Fˆ − pF
px
F + x.
Thus,
D′ + P ′ = a+ e1Fˆ + e2
(
pF
px
Fˆ − pF
px
F + x
)
+ e3F − e4x+ e5εF ′ − e6εx′
+e7ε
D′ + e8εS′
= a+
(
e1 + e2
pF
px
)
Fˆ +
(
e3 − e2 pF
px
)
F + (−e4 + e2)x
+e5ε
F ′ − e6εx′ + e7εD′ + e8εS′.
Given this expression, the conditional expectation for the informed is given by
E
(
D′ + P ′|ΩI) = a+ (e1 + e2 pF
px
)
Fˆ +
(
e3 − e2 pF
px
)
F + (−e4 + e2) xˆ (A.16)
V ar
(
D′ + P ′|ΩI) = e25σ2F + e26σ2x + e27σ2D + e28σ2S (A.17)
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The conditional expectation for the uninformed is given by
E
(
D′ + P ′|ΩU) = a+ (e1 + e2 pF
px
)
Fˆ +
(
e3 − e2 pF
px
)
Fˆ + (−e4 + e2) xˆ (A.18)
V ar
(
D′ + P ′|ΩU) = HΣH ′ + e25σ2F + e26σ2x + e27σ2D + e28σ2S , (A.19)
where H =
[
e3 −e4
]
=
[
ρF
(
1 + pF + pFˆ (Y1pF + Y2 + Y3)
) −ρx (pFˆY1px + px) ] ;
Σ solves equation A.2.
Now the market clearning is given by
λDI + (1− λ)DU = x.
Plug in the demand function (A.3):
λ
E
[
D′ + P ′|ΩI]−RP
αV ar [D′ + P ′|ΩI ] + (1− λ)
E
[
D′ + P ′|ΩI]−RP
αV ar [D′ + P ′|ΩI ] = x.
Plug in the conditional expectation and variance from equations A.16 and A.18:
λ
a+
(
e1 + e2
pF
px
)
Fˆ +
(
e3 − e2 pFpx
)
F + (−e4 + e2)x−RP
αV I
+ (1− λ)
a+
(
e1 + e2
pF
px
)
Fˆ +
(
e3 − e2 pFpx
)
Fˆ + (−e4 + e2)x−RP
αV U
= x
where V I = V ar
(
D′ + P ′|ΩI) ;V U = V ar (D′ + P ′|ΩU) .
Rearranging and matching coefficients, we have three equations determining pFˆ , pF , px :
λ
e1 + e2
pF
px
αV I
+ (1− λ) e1 + e3
αV U
=
(
λ
R
αV I
+ (1− λ) R
αV U
)
pFˆ (A.20)
λ
e3 − e2 pFpx
αV I
=
(
λ
R
αV I
+ (1− λ) R
αV U
)
pF (A.21)
λ
−e4 + e2
αV I
+ (1− λ) −e4 + e2
αV U
− 1 = −
(
λ
R
αV I
+ (1− λ) R
αV U
)
px (A.22)
Note that we only need to keep track of one of pFˆ and pF . To see this, sum equations A.20
and A.21:
e1 + e3 =
(
pFˆ + pF
)
R
pFˆ ρ
F (1− Y1pF − Y2) + ρF
(
1 + pF + pFˆ (Y1pF + Y2)
)
=
(
pFˆ + pF
)
R
pFˆ ρ
F + ρF + ρF pF =
(
pFˆ + pF
)
R
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pFˆ + pF =
ρF
R− ρF . (A.23)
Thus, we only need to know, say, pF , and we can deduce pFˆ =
ρF
R−ρF − pF . Hence, for any
λ, the exogenous information steady state Φ (λ) is (Σ, pF , px) characterized by equations A.2,
A.21, and A.22.
Next, I show that when λ = 0, the system of equations A.2, A.21, and A.22 can be explicitly
solved. First, note that by equation A.21, pF = 0. Second, by A.23, pFˆ =
ρF
R−ρF . To find px,
rearrange A.22: [
λ
1
αV I
+ (1− λ) 1
αV U
]
(−e4 + e2 +Rpx) = 1[
λ
1
αV I
+ (1− λ) 1
αV U
] (−ρx (pFˆY1px + px)+ pFˆY1pxρx +Rpx) = 1[
λ
1
αV I
+ (1− λ) 1
αV U
]
(−ρxpx +Rpx) = 1
(R− ρx)
[
λ
1
αV I
+ (1− λ) 1
αV U
]
px = 1. (A.24)
Next, we need to look for expressions of V I , V U . To do so, we need to first find the matrix
Σ =
[
V ar
(
F |ΩU) Cov (F, x|ΩU)
Cov
(
F, x|ΩU) V ar (x|ΩU)
]
.
Note that everyone, including the uninformed, observes the price signal SP = pFF − pxx.
Thus
Cov
(
F, x|ΩU) = Cov(F, pFF − SP
px
|ΩU
)
=
pF
px
V ar
(
F |ΩU)
V ar
(
x|ΩU) = V ar(pFF − SP
px
|ΩU
)
=
(
pF
px
)2
V ar
(
F |ΩU) .
Thus, we only need to find V ar
(
F |ΩU) to determine Σ. Denote V ar (F |ΩU) = ΣF .
Thus,
Σ =
 1 pFpx
pF
px
(
pF
px
)2
ΣF
Then,
AΣA′ =
 (ρF )2 ρF ρx pFpx
ρF ρx pFpx (ρ
x)
2
(
pF
px
)2
ΣF
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AΣA′ +Q =
 (ρF )2 ρF ρx pFpx
ρF ρx pFpx (ρ
x)
2
(
pF
px
)2
ΣF + [ σ2F
σ2x
]
=
 (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F ρF ρx pFpx ΣF
ρF ρx pFpx ΣF (ρ
x)
2
(
pF
px
)2
ΣF + σ
2
x

Note that
GAΣA′G′ +GQG′ +R =

(px)
2
σ2x 0 0
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
D
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
S

when pF = 0. Now we can write out equation A.2 explicitly, which, when λ = 0 and thus
pF = 0, is reduced to
[
1 0
0 0
]
ΣF =
 (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F ρF ρx pFpx ΣF
ρF ρx
pF
px
ΣF (ρ
x)2
(
pF
px
)2
ΣF + σ
2
x
−
 0 (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F
−pxσ2x 0 0


(px)
2 σ2x 0 0
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
D
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
S

−1
 0 (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F (ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F
0 0 0
′
The determinant when λ = 0 is
Θ =
∣∣∣[GAΣA′G′ +GQG′ + R]∣∣∣ = (px)2 σ2x [((ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F + σ2D)((ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F + σ2S)− ((ρF )2 ΣF + σ2F)2]
(A.25)
Thus,
[
GAΣA
′
G
′
+GQG
′
+ R
]−1
=

(px)
2 σ2x 0 0
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
D
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
0
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
S

−1
=
1
Θ

Θ
(px)2σ2x
0 0
0 (px)
2 σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
S
)
(px)
2 σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
)
0 (px)
2 σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
)
(px)
2 σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F + σ
2
D
)

=

1
(px)2σ2x
0 0
0
(px)
2σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF+σ
2
F+σ
2
S
)
Θ
−
(px)
2σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF+σ
2
F
)
Θ
0 −
(px)
2σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF+σ
2
F
)
Θ
(px)
2σ2x
((
ρF
)2
ΣF+σ
2
F+σ
2
D
)
Θ
 when λ = 0
Plug in these terms and pick the first entry of the matrices. One obtains that ΣF must solve
67
the following equation when λ = 0:
ΣF =
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F −
(
σ2S + σ
2
D
) ((
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
)2
[(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F + σ
2
D
)(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F + σ
2
S
)
−
(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F
)2]
(A.26)
Denote the solution to this equation Σ0 (we rule out negative roots). Intuitively, Σ0 is the
conditional mean of F for the uninformed when there are no informed investors.
We still need to obtain some expression for Y1,Y2, and Y3 when λ = 0. Remember that they
are entries of the first column of matrix [AΣA′G′ +QG′] [GAΣA′G′ +GQG′ +R]−1 .
We can take out each element of the first row of the matrix:
θ1 = Y1|λ=0 = 0 (A.27)
θ2 = Y2|λ=0 =
σ2S
[(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
[(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F + σ
2
D
)(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F + σ
2
S
)
−
(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F
)2] (A.28)
θ3 = Y3|λ=0 =
σ2D
[(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
[(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F + σ
2
D
)(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F + σ
2
S
)
−
(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F
)2] (A.29)
Denote
θ0 = θ2 + θ3 (A.30)
.
Crucially, note that
θ0 = θ2 + θ3
=
(
σ2D + σ
2
S
) [(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
[(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F + σ
2
D
)(
(ρF )
2
ΣF + σ2F + σ
2
S
)
−
(
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F
)2]
=
(
σ2D + σ
2
S
) [(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
[
(σ2D + σ
2
S)
[
(ρF )
2
Σ0 + σ2F
]
+ σ2Dσ
2
S
] ∈ [0, 1]
Now we are ready to derive expressions for V I and V U :
V
I
= e
2
5σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D + e
2
8σ
2
S
=
(
1 + pF + pFˆ (Y1pF + Y2 + Y3)
)2
σ
2
F +
(
−
(
p
Fˆ
Y1px + px
))2
σ
2
x +
(
p
Fˆ
Y2 + 1
)2
σ
2
D +
(
p
Fˆ
Y3
)2
σ
2
S
→
(
1 + p
Fˆ
(Y2 + Y3)
)2
σ
2
F + p
2
xσ
2
x +
(
p
Fˆ
Y2 + 1
)2
σ
2
D +
(
p
Fˆ
Y3
)2
σ
2
S
=
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2
σ
2
F +
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ2
)2
σ
2
D +
(
ρF
R− ρF θ3
)2
σ
2
S + p
2
xσ
2
x
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V
U
= HΣH
′
+ e
2
5σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D + e
2
8σ
2
S
→
[
ρF
(
1 + p
Fˆ
(Y2 + Y3)
)
−ρxpx
] [ Σ0 0
0 0
] [
ρF
(
1 + p
Fˆ
(Y2 + Y3)
)
−ρxpx
]′
+
1 + ρF
R− ρF
(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
σ2
D
+
(
ρF
)2 Σ0 + σ2F

2 [
σ
2
F + σ
2
D
]
+ p
2
xσ
2
x +
(
p
Fˆ
Y3
)2
σ
2
S
=
(
ρ
F
)2 (
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2
Σ0 +
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2
σ
2
F +
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ2
)2
σ
2
D +
(
ρF
R− ρF θ3
)2
σ
2
S + p
2
xσ
2
x
Plug expression for V I and V U back into equation A.24 and take λ→ 0, rearranging,
ασ
2
xp
2
x−
(
R− ρx) px+α
(ρF )2 (1 + ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2
Σ0 +
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2
σ
2
F +
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ2
)2
σ
2
D +
(
ρF
R− ρF θ3
)2
σ
2
S

Thus, px is well defined if and only if
(
R− ρx)2 − 4α2σ2x
(1 + ρF
R− ρF θ0
)2 [(
ρ
F
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
+
(
1 +
ρF
R− ρF θ2
)2
σ
2
D +
(
ρF
R− ρF θ3
)2
σ
2
S
 > 0
Denote ∆ = (R− ρx)2−4α2σ2x
((
1 + ρ
F
R−ρF θ0
)2 [(
ρF
)2
Σ0 + σ
2
F
]
+
(
1 + ρ
F
R−ρF θ2
)2
σ2D +
(
ρF
R−ρF θ3
)2
σ2S
)
, then at
high volatility equilibria:
px =
R− ρx +√∆
2ασ2x
(A.31)
By continuity, when λ is very small, real roots to px still exists.
Auxiliary Results
Derivative of an inverse matrix
Proposition A.0.1 Let A be a nonsingular, m×m matrix whose elements are functions of the
scalar parameter α. Then:
∂A−1
∂α
= −A−1 ∂A
∂α
A−1
Proof. The definition of inverse is
A−1A = I
Differentiating this expression with respect to α and rearranging, one obtains the result.
A.0.1 Proof of lemma 1.3.3
The proof is organized into two parts. The first part proves that the value of information is
the ratio of uncertainty faced by the uninformed and informed and derives an exact formula for
pi (λ) . The second part derives the derivative pi′ (λ) when λ→ 0.
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Step 1: Deriving formula of pi (λ) We will show that, at the exogenous-information
steady state Φ(λ), the value of information
pi(λ) =
WU
W I
=
√
V ar(P ′ +D′|ΩU )
V ar(P ′ +D′|ΩI)
This is an extension of Theorem 2 in [1]. Note that P ′ denotes the next period equilibrium price
whereas P denotes current price. Simplify agents’ budget constraint: c(s′) = (D′ + P ′ −RP )e.
Plugging into the utility function, we obtain the expected utility of each type of agent after the
market opens:
W i(P ) = max
e
∫
s′
U((D′ + P ′ −RP )e)dH(s′|Ωi)
Given CARA utility:
W i(P ) = max
e
∫
s′
U((D′ + P ′ −RP )e)dH(s′|Ωi)
= max
e
∫
s′
−e(−α((D′+P ′−RP )e))dH(s′|Ωi)
= max
e
− exp[E[−α((D′ + P ′ −RP )e)|Ii] + 1
2
V ar(−α((D′ + P ′ −RP )e)|Ωi)]
= max
e
− exp[−α(E[D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi]e− 1
2
αe2V ar(D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi))] (A.32)
Hence, maximizing over the objective function is equivalent to maximizing
max
e
E[D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi]e− 1
2
αe2V ar(D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi)
Solve for optimal s∗:
e∗ =
E[D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi]
αV ar(D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi)
Plug back into the original objective function:
W i(P ) = − exp[−1
2
α
(E[D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi])2
αV ar(D′ + P ′ −RP |Ωi) ]
= − exp[−1
2
(E[D′ + P ′|Ωi]−RP )2
V ar(D′ + P ′|Ωi) ] (A.33)
where the second equation follows because P is realized at this stage. Let
h = V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )− V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI) > 0
The reason why it is greater than 0 is that the uninformed have residual uncertainty over
the current F whereas the informed are perfectly informed about F . Taking the conditional
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expectation of the informed WI(P ) of the uninformed agents’ information set:
E[W i(P )|ΩU ] = E[−e− 12
(E[D′+P ′|ΩI ]−RP )2
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI ) |ΩU ]
= E[−e− 12
(E[D′+P ′|ΩI ]−RP )2
h
h
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI ) |ΩU ]
= E[−e− 12 hV ar(D′+P ′|ΩI ) z
2
|ΩU ],
(A.34)
where z = (E[D
′+P ′|ΩI ]−RP )√
h
.
Thus, by the moment-generating function of a noncentral chi-squared distribution (formula
A21 of [1]):
E[W i(P )|ΩU ] = 1√
1 + h
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
exp(
−E[z|ΩU ]2 12 hV ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
1 + h
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
)
=
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
V ar(D′ + P ′|IU ) exp(
−E[z|ΩU ]2 12 hV ar(D′+P ′|Ωi)
1 + hV ar(D′+P ′|Ωi)
)
=
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU ) exp(
− 12 (E[D′ + P ′|ΩU ]−RP )2
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU ) )
=
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )WU (P )
Integrating on both sides with respect to the current state s, one gets:
WI =
√
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩI)
V ar(D′+P ′|ΩU )WU (A.35)
Thus,
pi(λ) =
WU
WI
=
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
Now we know that
D′ + P ′ = a+ e1Fˆ + e2xˆ+ e3F − e4x+ e5εF ′ − e6εx′ + e7εD′, (A.36)
where expressions of ei are given by A.6 through A.13.
Thus, by equation A.17 and A.19:
pi(λ) =
WU
WI
=
√
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩU )
V ar(D′ + P ′|ΩI)
=
√
HΣH ′ + e25σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D
e25σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D
(A.37)
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Note that all the objects in A.37: H,Σ, e5, e6, e7, are functions of ΣF , pF , px, which are
ultimately implicit functions of λ, determined by equations A.2, A.21, and A.22. I omit the
dependence here just to ease notation.
Step 2: Evaluate pi′ (λ) when λ → 0 First we represent equations A.2, A.21, and A.22
as
G1 (ΣF , pF , px) = 0
G2 (ΣF , pF , px, λ) = 0
G3 (ΣF , pF , px, λ) = 0
from which we can derive the derivates ∂ΣF∂λ ,
∂pF
∂λ and
∂px
∂λ by implicit differentiation. To
begin, note that function G1 does not contain λ. Therefore, we can think of ΣF as an implicit
function of pF and px and evaluate the implicit derivative
∂ΣF
∂pF
and ∂ΣF∂px .We can show the
following important result: ∂ΣF∂pF =
∂ΣF
∂px
= 0 :
G1 (ΣF , pF , px)
=
(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F −
[
(ρF )
2
ΣF+σ
2
F−ρF ρxΣF
]2
p2Fσ
2
D−
[
(ρF )
2
ΣF+σ
2
F
]2
[p2FΣF (ρ
F−ρx)ρx−p2xσ2x]
σ2D[p2F (ρF−ρx)2ΣF+p2Fσ2F+p2xσ2x]+σ2F (ρF )2p2FΣF+(ρF )2p2xσ2xΣF+p2xσ2xσ2F
− ΣF
=
[(
ρF
)2 − 1]ΣF + σ2F −
[
(ρF )
2
ΣF+σ
2
F−ρF ρxΣF
]2 p2F
p2x
σ2D−
[
(ρF )
2
ΣF+σ
2
F
]2[ p2F
p2x
ΣF (ρF−ρx)ρx−σ2x
]
σ2D
[
p2
F
p2x
(ρF−ρx)2ΣF+ p
2
F
p2x
σ2F+σ
2
x
]
+σ2F (ρ
F )2
p2
F
p2x
ΣF+(ρF )
2σ2xΣF+σ
2
xσ
2
F
=
[(
ρF
)2 − 1]ΣF + σ2F − [(ρF )2ΣF+σ2F−ρF ρxΣF ]2uσ2D−[(ρF )2ΣF+σ2F ]2[uΣF (ρF−ρx)ρx−σ2x]σ2D[u(ρF−ρx)2ΣF+uσ2F+σ2x]+σ2F (ρF )2ΣFu+(ρF )2σ2xΣF+σ2xσ2F
where u=
[
p2F
p2x
]2
Define a new function:
N1 (ΣF , u) =
[(
ρ
F
)2 − 1]ΣF + σ2F −
[(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F − ρF ρxΣF
]2
uσ2D −
[(
ρF
)2
ΣF + σ
2
F
]2 [
uΣF
(
ρF − ρx
)
ρx − σ2x
]
σ2
D
[
u
(
ρF − ρx)2 ΣF + uσ2F + σ2x] + σ2F (ρF )2 ΣF u + (ρF )2 σ2xΣF + σ2xσ2F
Thus,
G1 (ΣF , pF , px) = N1
(
ΣF ,
p2F
p2x
)
By implicit differentiation:
∂ΣF
∂pF
= −
∂G1
∂pF
∂G1
∂ΣF
−
∂N1
∂u
∂u
∂pF
∂N1
∂ΣF
= −
∂N1
∂u
∂N1
∂ΣF
2
pF
p2x
→ 0
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Likewise,
∂ΣF
∂px
→ 0
Now, G2 and G3 are given by
G2 = λ
e3 − e2 pFpx
αV I
−
(
λ
R
αV I
+ (1− λ) R
αV U
)
pF = 0
G3 =
[
λ
1
αV I
+ (1− λ) 1
αV U
]
[−e4 + e2 +Rpx]− 1 = 0
To derive ∂pF∂λ and
∂px
∂λ , define pi =
V U
V I
. Substitute in pi whenever possible. Then,
G2 (λ, pF , px, pi) = λ
e3 − e2 pFpx
α
pi −
(
λ
1
α
pi + (1− λ) 1
α
)
RpF = 0
G3 (λ, pF , px, pi) =
[
λ
α
pi + (1− λ) 1
α
]
[−e4 + e2 +Rpx]− V U = 0
∂G2
∂λ
=
e3 − e2 pFpx
α
pi →
ρF
(
1 + ρ
F
R−ρF θ0
)
α
pi
∂G2
∂pF
= λ
∂e3−e2 pFpx
∂pF
α
pi −
(
λ
R
α
pi + (1− λ) R
α
)
= −R
α
∂G2
∂px
= 0
∂G2
∂pi
= 0
∂G3
∂λ
=
[
1
α
pi − 1
α
]
[−e4 + e2 +Rpx]→ 1
α
[pi − 1] [R− ρx] px
∂G3
∂pF
=
[
λ
α
pi + (1− λ) 1
α
] [
∂ (−e4 + e2)
∂pF
]
− ∂V
U
∂pF
= − 1
α
ρxpx
ρF
R− ρF
∂Y1
∂pF
− ∂V
U
∂pF
∂G3
∂px
=
[
λ
α
pi + (1− λ) 1
α
] [
∂ (−e4 + e2)
∂px
+R
]
− ∂V
U
∂px
=
1
α
[−ρx +R]− ∂V
U
∂px
∂G3
∂pi
= 0
Total differentiation of G2 and G3 gives[
∂G2
∂pF
+ ∂G2∂pi
∂pi
∂pF
∂G2
∂px
+ ∂G2∂pi
∂pi
∂px
∂G3
∂pF
+ ∂G3∂pi
∂pi
∂pF
∂G3
∂px
+ ∂G3∂pi
∂pi
∂px
][
∂pF
∂λ
∂px
∂λ
]
= −
[
∂G2
∂λ
∂G3
∂λ
]
Substituting in each term gives[
−Rα 0
− 1αρxpx ρ
F
R−ρF
∂Y1
∂pF
− ∂V U∂pF 1α [−ρx +R]− ∂V
U
∂px
][
∂pF
∂λ
∂px
∂λ
]
= −
 ρF(1+ ρFR−ρF θ0)α pi
1
α [pi − 1] [R− ρx] px

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∂pF
∂λ
=
ρF
(
1 + ρ
F
R−ρF θ0
)
R
pi (A.38)
∂px
∂λ
=
− 1α [pi − 1] [R− ρx] px +
(
1
αρxpx
ρF
R−ρF
∂Y1
∂pF
+ ∂V
U
∂pF
)
∂pF
∂λ
1
α [−ρx +R]− ∂V
U
∂px
We can also evaluate
∂ΣF
∂λ
=
∂ΣF
∂pF
∂pF
∂λ
+
∂ΣF
∂px
∂px
∂λ
= 0
∂pF
∂λ
+ 0
∂px
∂λ
= 0
We are ready to evaluate pi′ (λ) when λ→ 0.
Define
Π (ΣF , pF , px) =
HΣH + e25σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D
e25σ
2
F + e
2
6σ
2
x + e
2
7σ
2
D
Then,
pi (λ) =
√
Π (ΣF (λ) , pF (λ) , px (λ))
pi′ (λ) =
1
2
Π−
1
2
[
∂Π
∂ΣF
∂ΣF
∂λ
+
∂Π
∂pF
∂pF
∂λ
+
∂Π
∂px
∂px
∂λ
]
=
1
2
Π−
1
2
[
∂Π
∂ΣF
0 +
∂Π
∂pF
∂pF
∂λ
+
∂Π
∂px
∂px
∂λ
]
=
1
2
Π−
1
2
[
∂Π
∂pF
∂pF
∂λ
+
∂Π
∂px
∂px
∂λ
]
Thus, the sign of pi′ (λ) only depends on the sign of ∂Π∂pF
∂pF
∂λ +
∂Π
∂px
∂px
∂λ .
Thus, ∂Π∂pF
∂pF
∂λ +
∂Π
∂px
∂px
∂λ > 0 if and only if
(1− θ0) ρF > ρx + φ(ρF , ρx, σ2x, σ2F , σ2D, σ2S , α,R) (A.39)
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.0.1 Proof of the main theorem
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, I prove that there exists multiple steady states. In the second
part, I proved that some (more than one) of these steady states are locally stable.
To prove the first part, we first need to solve for the unique unconstrained steady state dropping the
borrowing constraint. The equations are given by:
ωh−σ0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
)σ
+ βp = p (B.1)
β
[
Aαkα−1l1−α + (1− δ)] = 1 (B.2)
c+ δk = Akαl1−α (B.3)
l
1
ν = w (B.4)
l =
(
γA
w
) 1
α
k (B.5)
By the second equation we obtain the capital-labor ratio:
k
l
=
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(B.6)
Plug it into equation B.5, we obtain the steady state level of wage. call it wss:
w
1
α = (γA)
1
α
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
wss = γA
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
Plug wss back to equation B.4, we obtain the steady state level of labor, lss:
lss = w
ν
ss =
(1− α)A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
ν
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Plug this into equation B.6, we obtain the steady state level of capital
kss =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
l
= ((1− α)A)ν
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1+αν
α−1
And steady state level of consumption is given by:
css = Ak
α
ssl
1−α
ss − δkss
=
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 lss
=
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(1− α)A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
ν
Lastly, the steady state land price pss is given by:
(1− β) pss = ωh−σ0
css − χ l1+ 1νss
1 + 1
ν
σ
pss =
ωh−σ0
(
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
)σ
(1− β)
And as this is a closed economy, agents ’ bond holding is equal to 0
bss = 0
Given objects (wss, lss, kss, css, pss) we define
ξss =
wsslss − κkss
pssh0
> 0
For κ sufficiently small it is feasible.
Next, we would like to show the following: for sufficiently small κ, given ξss, there exists multiple steady
states in benchmark model. To show this, note that the unconstrained steady states is automatically a steady
state because by definition of ξss, it satisfies the borrowing constraint. Thus we only need to show that there
exists another steady state and we are done. The system characterizing the steady state is given, as in the main
text, by
ωh
− 1
η
0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
) 1
η
+ βp+
(
(1− α)Akα (l)γ−1
w
− 1
)
ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)γ + (1− δ) +
(
(1− α)Akα (l)γ−1
w
− 1
)
κ
]
= 1
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α
l
1
ν = w
min
(
ξssph0 + κk
w
,
(
(1− α)A
w
) 1
α
k
)
= l
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The only difference is that we focus on the case where ξ = ξss.
We wish to show that apart from (wss, lss, kss, css, pss) , there exists another set of variables that solve these
equations. First of all, we conjecture, and later verify that at the other steady state
ξssph0
w
≤
(
(1− α)A
w
) 1
α
k
Thus we end up with a differentiable system of equations
ωh−σ0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
)σ
+ βp+
(
(1− α)Akαl−α
w
− 1
)
ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1l1−α + (1− δ) +
(
(1− α)Akα (l)γ−1
w
− 1
)
κ
]
= 1
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α
l
1
ν = w
ξssph0 + κk
w
= l
Also since we take κ to be sufficiently small, we can further simplify the system considerably by looking at
the limiting case where κ = 0 (Rigorously speaking, we are interchanging limit and differentiation. To do so, we
need to show that for a sequence of κn → 0, the resulting sequence of functions f (p;κn) converges uniformly to
f (p; 0) . This is guaranteed by the fact that f is differntiable with respect to κ, and the derivative is bounded.
See Walter Rudin’s Principle of Mathematical Analysis, 3rd Edition, Theorem 7.17):
ωh
− 1
η
0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
)σ
+ βp+
(
(1− α)Akα (l)−α
w
− 1
)
ξp = p (B.7)
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)1−α + (1− δ)
]
= 1 (B.8)
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α (B.9)
l
1
ν = w (B.10)
ξssph0
w
= l (B.11)
From the second equation of the system, we have
l =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
1−α
k
Thus by the fourth equation
w = l
1
ν
=
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)ν
k
1
ν
We can substitute out w by plugging in the fifth equation
ξssph0
w
= l
We obtain ( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)
k = (ξssh0p)
1
1+ 1
ν
k = Mp
ν
1+ν
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Where M is a constant defined as
M =
(ξssh0)
1
1+ 1
ν(
1
β
−1+δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)
Also note that
l =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
1−α
k
=
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
1−α
Mp
ν
1+ν
= Np
ν
1+ν
Where N is a constant defined as
N = M
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
1−α
We also obtain wage:
w = l
1
ν
=
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)ν
k
1
ν
=
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)ν (
Mp
ν
1+ν
) 1
ν
= Qp
1
1+ν
Where Q is yet another constant defined as
Q =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
(1−α)ν
M
1
ν
Thus we can also express consumption as a function of land price p :
c = Akαl1−α − δk
= A
(
Mp
ν
1+ν
)α (
Np
ν
1+ν
)1−α − δMp ν1+ν
=
[
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν
Plug everything into the equation B.4 and we have one equation with one unknown.
f (p) =
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
(
c− χ l
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
)σ
+ βp+
(
(1− α)Akα (l)−α
w
− 1
)
ξp− p
Rearrange:
f (p) =
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
([
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν − χN
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
p
)σ
+
(1− α)A
(
1
β
−1+δ
Aα
) −α
1−α
Q
ξp
ν
1+ν = 0
(B.12)
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We wish to show that equality B.12 has multiple roots. As argued previously, one root is pss as the unconstrained
steady state is automatically a steady state by the choice of ξss. Also note that p = 0 is a trivial steady state.
Next we would like to show the following two statements
1. f ′ (pss) > 0
2. f ′ (0) > 0
If the above two statements are true, then by continuity of f and the intermediate value theorem, we obtain
another nontrivial steady state p ∈ (0, pss)
The derivative f ′ (p) is given by:
f ′ (p) = σ
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
([
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν − χN
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
p
)σ−1
(B.13)
[
ν
1 + ν
[
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν
−1 − χN
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
]
+
ν
1 + ν
(1− α)A
(
1
β
−1+δ
Aα
) −α
1−α
Q
ξp
ν
1+ν
−1 − (1− β + ξ)
We want to show that the first statement holds: f ′ (pss) > 0. Plug p = pss into equation B.14:
f ′ (pss) = σ
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
css − χ l1+ 1νss
1 + 1
ν
σ−1  ν
1 + ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1 + 1
ν
 1
pss
+
ν
1 + ν
(1− α)A
(
1
β
−1+δ
Aα
) −α
1−α
Q
ξp
−1
1+ν
ss − (1− β + ξ)
= σ
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
css − χ l1+ 1νss
1 + 1
ν
σ−1  ν
1 + ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1 + 1
ν
 1
pss
− 1
1 + ν
ξ − (1− β)
= σ
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
css − χ l1+ 1νss
1 + 1
ν
σ−1  ν
1 + ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1 + 1
ν
 1− β
(1−ω)
ω
h
− 1
η
0
(
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
) 1
η
− 1
1 + ν
ξ − (1− β)
= (1− β)σ
css − χ l1+ 1νss
1 + 1
ν
−1  ν
1 + ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1 + 1
ν

− 1
1 + ν
ξ − (1− β)
= (1− β)σ
ν
1+ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
− 1
1 + ν
ξ − (1− β)
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Note that for f ′ (pss) > 0, the first term
(1− β)σ
ν
1+ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
must be positive and sufficiently big, as the next two terms are negative. Note that when ν →∞,
f ′ (pss) = (1− β) (σ − 1)
Thus when ν →∞, I only need σ > 1 to guarantee that f ′(pss) > 0.
On the other hand, when σ is sufficiently big, I only need v > ν0 where ν0 is given by:
ν0 = χ
1− α
1− αδ1
β
−1+δ
When ν > ν0,
ν
1 + ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1 + 1
ν
> 0
This guarantees that when σ → +∞
(1− β)σ
ν
1+ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
css − χ l
1+ 1
ν
ss
1+ 1
ν
→ +∞
Thus,
f ′ (pss) > 0 as σ sufficiently big
In sum, for σ and ν sufficiently big, f ′ (pss) > 0.
Let’s turn to the second statement f ′ (0) > 0
Take p→ 0 into equation B.14. We examine the behavior of each term separately. Note that the first term
σ
(1− ω)
ω
h−σ0
([
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν − χN
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
p
)σ−1
[
ν
1 + ν
[
A (M)α (N)1−α − δM
]
p
ν
1+ν
−1 − χN
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
]
is of the same order of
p
ν
1+ν
σ−1
and thus → 0 when σ is sufficiently big The second term
ν
1 + ν
(1− α)A
(
1
β
−1+δ
Aα
) −α
1−α
Q
ξp
ν
1+ν
−1 → +∞
as p
ν
1+ν
−1 → +∞
The third term is a constant.
− (1− β + ξ)
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Thus, for σ sufficiently big, the second term dominates and therefore
f ′ (0) > 0
Lastly, we need to verify that at the new steady state:
ξssph0
w
<
(
(1− α)A
w
) 1
α
k
Plug in k,w as a function of p derived from other equilibrium conditions:
k = Mp
ν
1+ν
w = Qp
1
1+ν
we obtain:
ξssph0
Qp
1
1+ν
<
(
(1− α)A
Qp
1
1+ν
) 1
α
Mp
ν
1+ν
Rearrange:
ξssh0
Q
p
ν
1+ν
(
(1− α)A
Q
) 1
α
Mp
ν
1+ν
− 1
α
1
1+ν
To do this comparison, first note that at p = pss, the equation is equalized:
ξsspssh0
Qp
1
1+ν
ss
=
 (1− α)A
Qp
1
1+ν
ss
 1α Mp ν1+νss
But for
p < pss
We have
ξssh0
Q
p
ν
1+ν <
(
(1− α)A
Q
) 1
α
Mp
ν
1+ν
− 1
α
1
1+ν
Because the left hand side decreases faster with p than the right hand side. Therefore we have
ξssph0
w
<
(
(1− α)A
w
) 1
α
k
At any steady state where p < pss. Therefore we have established that for ξ = ξss there exists multiple nontrivial
steady states.
Next, we estabilish that for ξ > ξss, but sufficiently close to ξss, there exists multiple nontrivial steady states
as well. This is obvious as f (p) is continuous with respect to ξ. Therefore, for sufficiently small changes in ξ, we
still have multiple nontrivial steady states.
To see this more precisely, we know that given ξ = ξss, there exists p1 < p2 such that f (p1; ξ = ξss) > 0
and f (p2; ξ = ξss) < 0. By continuity of f with respect to ξ, a small change in ξ still preverves that f (p1; ξ) > 0
and f (p2) < 0.
This implies that multiple nontrivial steady states exist. Thus we can pick an interval Uξ such that for any
ξ ∈ Uξ, multiple steady states exist.
Next, we would like to show that more than 1 steady states are locally stable. Pick a ξ such that ξ > ξss.
We need to show the following three lemmas to prove locally stability.
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Lemma B.0.1 The unconstrained steady state is locally stable
Proof. As the credit constraint is slack, the dynamic system is identical to that of a standard neoclassical model.
Thus standard argument applies and therefore the steady state is locally stable. See SLP.
Lemma B.0.2 There exists 0 < p < pss such that f (p) = 0 and f ′ (p) < 0
Proof. we know that there exists two points p1 < p2 such that f (p1) > 0 and f (p2) < 0. By continuity, this
implies that there exists at least one p ∈ (p1, p2) such that f ′ (p) < 0.To see this, suppose the contrary, that for
any p such that f (p) = 0, f ′ (p) > 0. Denote the set of steady state p : P = {p; f (p) = 0} . Pick pinf = inf P.
By continuity f (pinf) = 0. But we know that every f (p) = 0 has the property that f
′ (p) > 0.Thus f ′ (pinf) > 0.
This implies that there exists p < pinf such that f (p) = 0 by the fact that f (p1) > 0. A contradiction. Therefore
there must exist at least one p ∈ (p1, p2) such that f ′ (p) < 0.
The second lemma will be useful later. Right now let’s write down the dynamic system around the constrained
steady state:
ωh−σ0
ct − χ l1+ 1νt
1 + 1
ν
σ + βpt+1 + ( (1− α)Akαl−α
w
− 1
)
ξpt = pt
β
ct+1 − χ l1+
1
ν
t+1
1 + 1
ν
−σ [Aαkα−1t+1 l1−αt+1 + (1− δ)] =
ct − χ l1+ 1νt
1 + 1
ν
−σ
ct + δkt = Ak
α
t (lt)
1−α
l
1
ν
t = wt
ξpth0
wt
= lt
From the last two equations we can substitute out lt :
(ξpth0)
ν
ν+1 = lt
And we are left with a three-equation dynamic system with three state variables (ct, kt, pt) :
ωh−σ0
(
ct − χ ξpth0
1 + 1
ν
)σ
+ βpt+1 +
(
(1− α)Akαl−α
w
− 1
)
ξpt = pt (B.14)
β
(
ct+1 − χξpt+1h0
1 + 1
ν
)−σ [
Aαkα−1t+1 l
1−α
t+1 + (1− δ)
]
=
(
ct − χ ξpth0
1 + 1
ν
)−σ
ct + δkt = Ak
α
t (ξpth0)
ν
ν+1
(1−α)
We denote S = (c, k). And we can write this equation compactly as[
pt+1
St+1
]
=
[
F (pt, St)
G (pt, St)
]
Where F,G are the transition matrices implicitly defined by the system B.14.
Linearize it around some steady state:[
pt+1
St+1
]
=
[
Fp FS
Gp GS
][
pt
St
]
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As there is one predetermined variable, k, We need to show that the eigenvalues associated with the linearized
transition matrix
[
Fp FS
Gp GS
]
has one and only one roots within the unit circle. Write down the characteristic
root equation:
δ (λ) =
 Fp − λ FS
Gp GS −
[
λ 0
0 λ
] 
This system has three roots λ1, λ2, λ3.We need to show that there is a unique root, call it λ1, such that |λ1| < 1.To
do that, we need to show that:
1. δ (0) > 0
2. δ (1) < 0
3. trace
([
Fp FS
Gp GS
])
> 3
See the online appendix for a detailed derivation of the three statements. The first two requirement guaran-
tees that there exists a root |λ1| < 1. The last requirement guarantees that only one root is inside the unit circle
as
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = trace
([
Fp FS
Gp GS
])
Requirement 1 and 3 are automatically satisfied when σ and ν are sufficiently big. Requirement 2 is satisfied
whenever f ′ (p) < 0. To see this note that the steady state equation is given by
f (p) = p− F (k (p) , p)
Thus
f ′ (p) = 1− Fkkp − Fp
Where kp is implicitly given by:
k −G (k, p) = 0
kp −Gkkp −Gp = 0
kp = [I −Gk]−1 (Gp)
Thus
f ′ (p) = 1− Fk [I −Gk]−1 (Gp)− Fp
Linearize the system: [
p′
k′
]
=
[
Fp Fk
Gp Gk
][
p
k
]
Thus the characteristic roots are given by
δ (λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣ Fp − λ FkGp Gk − λI
∣∣∣∣∣
= det
(
(Fp − λ)− Fk (Gk − λI)−1 Gp
)
det (Gk − λI)
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Note that
δ (1) = det
(
(Fp − 1)− Fk (Gk − λI)−1 Gp
)
det (Gk − I)
= −f ′ (p) det (Gk − I)
= f ′ (p) det (I −Gk)
We can show that det (I −Gk) > 0, Thus
sign (δ (1)) = sign
(
f ′ (p)
)
QED.
B.1 An economy with perfectly sticky wages
In this section we describe a detailed economy where theorem 2 applies. To distinguish from Shimer, we assume
that production technology is decreasing returns to scale. All other model setups are the same as the benchmark
model in section 2. Specifically, the household-enterprenuer’s problem is:
max
c,h,l,ld,k
∞∑
t=1
U(c, h, l)
subject to
ct + ptht + bt + kt ≤ wtlt + pit + ptht−1 + qtbt+1 + (1− δ)kt−1
pit = max
ldt
A
(
ldt
)γ
kαt−1 − wtldt
qtbt+1 + θwtl
d
t ≤ ξptht + κkt
0 ≤ lt ≤ l0, ct, ht, kt ≥ 0, h0, k0 given
Relative to the model described in section 2, we make two major changes. First, the households preference
is given by:
U(c, h, l) =
[[
ωc1−1/η + (1− ω)h1−1/η]1/(1−1/η)]1−σ
1− σ − χ
l1+
1
ν
1 + 1
ν
.Second, the production technology is given by:
y = A
(
ldt
)γ
kαt−1
where we assume that
γ + α ≤ 1
.
Next, we wish to define an equilibrium with perfectly sticky wage. To do so, we first of all solve for the
unconstrained steady state. That is, we drop the borrowing constraints for the firm and solve for the steady
state.
β
(
αAlγkα−1 + 1− δ) = 1
ωc−1/η
[
ωc1−1/η + (1− ω)h1−1/η0
](1−σ)/(1−1/η)−1
= wχl
1
ν
c = Alγkα − δk
w = γAlγ−1kα
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The first equation is the intertemporal first order condition for capital. The second one is the first order
condition for labor. The third one is the resources constraints. The fourth one is the firm’s hiring first order
constraint. We have four equations and four unknowns (k, l, c, w) . And we can solve for the unique unconstrained
steady state denote it (kss, lss, css, wss) .
We will focus on competitive equilibrium where wage is exogenously fixed at w¯ = wss. We next state the
definition of a competitive equilibrium:
Definition B.1.1 A sticky-wage competitive equilibrium given wss is a sequence of allocations
{
ct, kt+1, ht+1, lt, ldt , bt
}∞
t=1
and sequence of prices {pt, wt, qt}∞t=1 such that:
1. Given prices, allocations solve the households problem
2. Housing and bond market clears every period h = h0, b = 0
3. wt = wss for any t. Equilibrium labor is determined by the minimum of the labor demand and labor
supply
Given the definition for a competitive equilibrium, a sticky-wage steady state is a competitive equilibrium
where capital stock kt is time invariant.
We next state our main theorem, which implies the theorem 2:
Theorem 4 Suppose η < 1. Then there exists an η¯ < 1 such that for any α + γ > η¯ and κ sufficiently small,
there exists an interval Uξ such that, if ξ ∈ Uξ, then there exists more than 1 locally stable sticky-wage steady
states given wss.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 2. First of all, we can solve for the unconstrained steady
state using the following equations, droping the borrowing constraint:
ωh
−1/η
0 c
1/η + βp = p
β
(
αAlγkα−1 + 1− δ) = 1
ωc−1/η
[
ωc1−1/η + (1− ω)h1−1/η0
](1−σ)/(1−1/η)−1
= wχl
1
ν
c = Alγkα − δk
w = γAlγ−1kα
Suppose the system has a unique solution. Denote it (kss, css, pss, lss, wss) . Define
ξss =
wsslss − κkss
pssh0
For κ sufficiently small, ξss > 0 and is thus feasible.
Next, we would like to show the following: for sufficiently small κ, given ξss, there exists multiple sticky-wage
steady states.
To show this, note that the unconstrained steady states is automatically a steady state because by definition
of ξss, it satisfies the borrowing constraint. Thus we only need to show that there exists another steady state
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and we are done. The system characterizing the steady state is given, as in the main text, by
ωh
− 1
η
0 (c)
1
η + βp+
(
γAkα (l)γ−1
wss
− 1
)
ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)γ + (1− δ) +
(
γAkα (l)γ−1
wss
− 1
)
κ
]
= 1
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α
min
(
ξssph0 + κk
wss
,
(
γA
wss
) 1
1−γ
k
α
1−γ
)
= l
Note that we drops the households labor first order condition as the wage is sticky. We will verify later that at
the other nontrivial steady state households first order condition satisfies
ωc−1/η
[
ωc1−1/η + (1− ω)h1−1/η0
](1−σ)/(1−1/η)−1
> wχl
1
ν
So the households would like to supply labor but are rationed out of the market.
We wish to show that apart from (wss, lss, kss, css, pss) , there exists another set of variables that solve these
equations. First of all, we conjecture, and later verify that at the other steady state
ξssph0
w
≤
(
γA
w
) 1
1−γ
k
α
1−γ
Thus we end up with a differentiable system of equations
ωh
− 1
η
0 (c)
1
η + βp+
(
γAkα (l)γ−1
wss
− 1
)
ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)γ + (1− δ) +
(
γAkα (l)γ−1
wss
− 1
)
κ
]
= 1
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α
ξssph0 + κk
wss
= l
Also since we take κ to be sufficiently small, we can further simplify the system considerably by looking at
the limiting case where κ = 0(Rigorously speaking, we are interchanging limit and differentiation. To do so, we
need to show that for a sequence of κn → 0, the resulting sequence of functions f ′ (p;κn) converges uniformly to
f ′ (p; 0) . This is guaranteed by the fact that f is differntiable with respect to κ, and the derivative is bounded.
See Walter Rudin’s Principle of Mathematical Analysis, 3rd Edition, Theorem 7.17):
ωh
− 1
η
0 (c)
1
η + βp+
(
γAkα (l)γ−1
wss
− 1
)
ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1 (l)γ + (1− δ)] = 1
c+ δk = Akα (l)1−α
ξssph0
wss
= l
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Plug l = ξssph0
wss
back to the first three equations, we obtain
ωh
− 1
η
0 (c)
1
η + βp+
γAkα
(
ξssph0
wss
)γ−1
wss
− 1
 ξp = p
β
[
Aαkα−1
(
ξssph0
wss
)γ
+ (1− δ)
]
= 1
c+ δk = Akα
(
ξssph0
wss
)1−α
Thus capital k can be expressed as a function of p from the second equation
k =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξph0
w¯
) −γ
α−1
= Np
γ
1−α
Where
N =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξh0
wss
) −γ
α−1
Thus by the third equation, consumption c is a function of p as well:
c = A
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1 (
ξph0
wss
)−αγ
α−1
(
ξph0
wss
)γ
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξph0
wss
) −γ
α−1
Thus
c = Mp
γ
1−α
Where
M = A
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1 (
ξh0
w¯
) −γ
α−1 − δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξh0
w¯
) −γ
α−1
Plug all of these into the first equation: Thus, p solves:
a
(
mp
γ
1−α
) 1
η
+ bp
γ
1−α − cp = 0 (B.15)
Where
a = θh−η0
m = A
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1 (
ξssh0
wss
) −γ
α−1 − δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξssh0
wss
) −γ
α−1
b = ξss
γA
wγss
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξssh0
wss
) −γ
α−1
α (ξssh0)γ−1
c = 1− β + ξss
We wish to show that equality B.15 has multiple roots. As argued previously, one root is pss as the unconstrained
steady state is automatically a steady state by the choice of ξss. Also note that p = 0 is a trivial steady state.
Next we would like to show the following two statements
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1. f ′ (pss) > 0
2. f ′ (0) > 0
If the above two statements are true, then by continuity of f and the intermediate value theorem, we obtain
another nontrivial steady state p ∈ (0, pss)
To prove the first statement, note that
f ′ (pss) =
1
η
γ
1− αa
(
mp
γ
1−α
ss
) 1
η
−1
mp
γ
1−α−1
ss +
γ
1− αbp
γ
1−α−1
ss − c
mp
γ
1−α
ss
= A
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1 (
ξssh0pss
wss
) −γ
α−1 − δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξssh0pss
wss
) −γ
α−1
note that
ξss =
wsslss
pssh0
mp
γ
1−α
ss = A
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
(lss)
−γ
α−1 − δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(lss)
−γ
α−1
=
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 (lss) γ1−α
= Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
bp
γ
1−α−1
ss = ξss
γA
wγss
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1 (
ξssh0
wss
) −γ
α−1
α (ξssh0)γ−1 p γ1−α−1ss
= ξ
1− αγ
α−1 +γ−1
ss w
−γ+ αγ
α−1
ss p
γ
1−α−1
ss γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(h0)
−γ
α−1
α (h0)γ−1
= ξ
γ
1−α
ss w
− γ
1−α
ss p
γ
1−α
ss γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(h0)
−γ
α−1
α (h0)γ−1 p−1ss
=
(
lss
h0
) γ
1−α
γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
(h0)
−γ
α−1
α (h0)γ−1 p−1ss
= (lss)
γ
1−α γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
α p−1ss h−10
= γAkαssl
γ
ssp
−1
ss h
−1
0
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Thus
f ′ (pss) = σ
γ
1− αa
(
mp
γ
1−α
ss
)σ−1
mp
γ
1−α−1
ss +
γ
1− αbp
γ
1−α−1
ss − c
= σ
γ
1− αa
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 (l0) γ1−α
σ−1
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 (l0) γ1−α /pss
+
γ
1− α (l0)
γ
1−α γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
α h−10 p−1ss − 1 + β − ξss
=
X
pss
− ξss − (1− β)
=
X
pss
− wssl0
pssh0
− (1− β)
=
X
pss
− wssl0
pssh0
− (1− β)
where
X =
1
η
γ
1− αa
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 (lss) γ1−α

1
η
−1
A( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) α
α−1
− δ
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
 (lss) γ1−α
+
γ
1− α (lss)
γ
1−α γA
( 1β − 1 + δ
Aα
) 1
α−1
α h−10
note that
kss =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
αA
) 1
α−1
l
− γ
α−1
ss
Thus
kαssl
γ
0 =
( 1
β
− 1 + δ
αA
) α
α−1
l
− γ
α−1
ss
Thus
X = σ
γ
1− αa (Ak
α
ssl
γ
ss − δkss)σ−1 [Akαsslγss − δkss]
+
γ
1− αγAk
α
ssl
γ
ssh
−1
0
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Thus
f ′ (pss) =
1
η
γ
1−αa
(
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
) 1
η
−1 [
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
]
+ γ
1−αγAk
α
ssl
γ
ssh
−1
0
pss
− γAk
α
sslssh
−1
0
pss
− (1− β)
=
1
η
γ
1−αa
(
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
) 1
η
−1 [
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
]
+
(
γ
1−α − 1
)
γAkαssl
γ
ssh
−1
0
θh
−η
0 (Ak
γ
sslαss−δkss)
1
η
1−β
− (1− β)
= (1− β)
 1η γ1−αa
(
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
) 1
η
−1 [
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
]
+
(
γ
1−α − 1
)
γAkαssl
γ
ssh
−1
0
θh−η0
(
Akγsslαss − δkss
) 1
η
− 1

= (1− β)
 θh−η0
(
Akαssl
γ
ss − δkss
) 1
η
−1 [ 1
η
γ
1−αAk
α
ssl
γ
ss − σ γ1−α δkss −Ak
γ
ssl
α
ss + δkss
]
θh−η0
(
Akγssl
α
0 − δkss
) 1
η

= (1− β)
 θh−η0 (css)
1
η
(
1
η
γ
1−α − 1
)
+
(
γ
1−α − 1
)
γAkαssl
γ
ssh
−1
0
θh−η0 (css)
1
η

Thus, f ′ (pss) > 0 if 1η is sufficiently big. Note that for a given η < 1, there exists
γ
1−α sufficiently close to
1, or equivalently α+ γ sufficiently close to 1, so that f ′ (pss) > 0
To prove the second statement, lets evaluate
f ′ (0)
= lim
p→0σ
γ
1− αa
(
mp
γ
1−α
)σ−1
mp
γ
1−α−1 +
γ
1− αbp
γ
1−α−1 − c
= σ
γ
1− αa (y0)
σ−1 mp
γ
1−α−1 +
γ
1− αbp
γ
1−α−1 − c
f ′ (0)
=
γ
1− αbp
γ
1−α−1 − c
And we know that
b is positive
So for p sufficiently small, this derivative is positive.
Therefore we have established that for ξ = ξss there exists multiple nontrivial steady states.
Next, we estabilish that for ξ > ξss, but sufficiently close to ξss, there exists multiple nontrivial steady states
as well. This is obvious as f (p) is continuous with respect to ξ. Therefore, for sufficiently small changes in ξ, we
still have multiple nontrivial steady states.
To see this more precisely, we know that given ξ = ξss, there exists p1 < p2 such that f (p1; ξ = ξss) > 0
and f (p2; ξ = ξss) < 0. By continuity of f with respect to ξ, a small change in ξ still preverves that f (p1; ξ) > 0
and f (p2) < 0. This implies that multiple nontrivial steady states exist. Thus we can pick an interval Uξ such
that for any ξ ∈ Uξ, multiple steady states exist.
The proof of local stability is very similar to the proof in theorem 2 and is hence delegated to the online
appendix. QED.
The theorem highlights the difference between this paper and Shimer(2012). Shimer’s result of multiple
steady state only holds with constant returns to scale production technology. Here, I deliberately choose the
production technology to be decreasing returns to scale and prove that there exists multiple steady states.
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B.2 Computational Appendix
In this section I describe the functional equations characterzing the recursive competitive equilibrium and how I
proceed to solve them. There are four functional equations that characterizes four equilibrium functions:
1. Law of motion for aggregate capital: K′ = Φ (K,W−) where W− is previous period wage.
2. Law of motion for wage: W = W (K,W−)
3. Land price function: P = P (K,W )
4. Labor function: L = L (K,W−)
We have four functional equations, incorporating two occasionally binding constraints, to solve these func-
tions. The first equation is the households first order condition for land.
The second equation is the firm’s first order condition for investment:
Uc
(
AKα (L (K,W−))γ h¯1−α−γf + (1− δ)K − Φ (K,W−)
)
(B.16)
= β[αA [Φ (K,W−)]α−1 [L (Φ (K,W−) ,W (K,W−))]γ h¯1−α−γf + 1− δ
+
κγA [Φ (K,W−)]α [L (Φ (K,W−) ,W (K,W−))]γ−1 h¯1−α−γf
W (Φ (K,W−) ,W (K,W−))
− κ]
Uc (A [Φ (K,W−)]α [L (Φ (K,W−) ,W (K,W−))]γ + (1− δ) Φ (K,W−)− Φ (Φ (K,W−) ,W (K,W−)))
The third equation is households first order condition, taking into account the downward wage rigidity
W (K,W−) = max
ζW−, χ (L (K,W−)) 1ν
Uc
(
AKα (L (K,W−))γ h¯1−α−γf + (1− δ)K − Φ (K,W−)
)
 (B.17)
The fourth equation is firm’s first order condition on hiring taking into account the borrowing constraint
L (K,W−) = min
{(
ζW (K,W−)
γA
) 1
γ−1
K
α
1−γ ,
ζP (K,W )h0 + κK
W (K,W−)
}
(B.18)
Now, this is a system of four equations and we would like to solve four equilibrium functions from it. We
employ a policy iteraction algorithm, adjusting for the occasionally binding constraint. Similar to Coleman(1990),
and Bianchi(2013). To reduce the number of equations we need to solve, a crucial observation is that: given
Φ (K,W−) and P (K,W ) , the labor market equilibrium can be solved seperately. Thus, we only need to run loops
with respect to Φ (K,W−) and P (K,W ) and solve W (K,W−) and L (K,W−) within each loop. Specifically:
1. Setup a state space UW × UK . I consider Uw = [0.8wss, wss] , UK = [0.8kss, kss] . This is sufficient for
our purpose. I pick 80 grids for wage (evenly spaced) and 100 grids for capital, 50 of the grids are placed
between [0.9kss, 0.95kss] where there are strong nonlinearities. It is crucial to set up fine grids for the
state variables, especially wage.
2. Make a good initial guess for Φ (K,W−) and P (K,W ) . Otherwise, the program would not converge
properly, especially for low η.To do so, I first solve a frionless case and a case with perfectly wage
stickiness and use them as the benchmark. Specifically, let Φf (K) and Pf (K) denote the law of motion
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and land price function a the frictionless case. Let Φs (K) and Ps (K) denote the law of motion and land
price function at perfect sticky wage case. I then conjecture:
Φ1 (K, (1− θ)wss) = θΦf (K) + (1− θ) Φs (K)
P 1 (K, (1− θ)wss) = θPf (K) + (1− θ)Ps (K)
Namely, I take a weighted average of the two benchmarks. The weights depend on how close the wage
grid is to wss. Turns out this is a good initial guess that can get the program converge
3. Given Φn (K,W−) and Pn (K,W ) , we can solve for Wn (K,W−) and Ln (K,W−) from equation B.17
and B.18. Specifically, we solve for w, l given K,W− and given Φn (K,W−) and Pn (K,W ) , from the
following two equations:
w = max
ζW−, χ (l) 1ν
Uc
(
AKα (l)γ h¯1−α−γf + (1− δ)K − Φn (K,W−)
)

l = min
{(
ζw
γA
) 1
γ−1
K
α
1−γ ,
ζPn (K,W )h0 + κK
w
}
4. Given Φn (K,W−), Pn (K,W ), Wn (K,W−) and Ln (K,W−) we can solve for Φn+1 (K,W−), Pn+1 (K,W )
by iterating on equation ?? and B.16. To do so, we need to take the following steps:
(a) Given any state variable (K,W−) , for any k′, p, we can solve for the conditional wage function
w (k′, p,K,W−) and the conditional labor function l (k′, p,K,W−) from equation B.17 and B.18:
w = max
ζW−, χ (l) 1ν
Uc
(
AKα (l)γ h¯1−α−γf + (1− δ)K − k′
)

l = min
{(
ζw
γA
) 1
γ−1
K
α
1−γ ,
ζph0 + κK
w
}
(b) Next, solve for k′, p, given that tomorrow the equilibrium functions are given by Φn (K,W−),
Pn (K,W ), Wn (K,W−) and Ln (K,W−) and today’s labor market equilibrium is given by the
conditional wage function w (k′, p,K,W−) and the conditional labor function l (k′, p,K,W−) :
Uc
(
AKα
(
l
(
k′, p,K,W−
))γ
h¯1−α−γf + (1− δ)K − k′
)
= β[αA
[
k′
]α−1 [
Ln
(
k′, w
(
k′, p,K,W−
))]γ
h¯1−α−γf + 1− δ
+
κγA [k′]α [Ln (k′, w (k′, p,K,W−))]γ−1 h¯1−α−γf
Wn (k′, w (k′, p,K,W−))
− κ]
Uc
(
A
[
k′
]α [
Ln
(
k′, w
(
k′, p,K,W−
))]γ
+ (1− δ) k′ − Φn (k′, w (k′, p,K,W−)))
The two equations solves p and k′ given K,W−. Thus we get Φn+1 (K,W−) and Pn+1 (K,W )
5. Compare [Φn (K,W−) , Pn (K,W )] and
[
Φn+1 (K,W−) , Pn+1 (K,W )
]
, if
max
∣∣[Φn (K,W−) , Pn (K,W )]− [Φn+1 (K,W−) , Pn+1 (K,W )]∣∣ < 10−8
stop. Otherwise, set n = n+ 1, go back to step 4.
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B.3 Various Graphs
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1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
Real House Price Index
Constant 2% Growth Trend
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, deflated by GDP deflator
This figure plots the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, deflated by the
GDP deflator, along with its constant growth trend. The growth rate is picked to be 2%,
as in [?]. This is the average growth rate for real GDP per capita between 1947 and
2007. It is also close to the average growth rate for real house prices between 1975 and
2006 (see Figure 1 in Davis and Heathcote, 2007).
Figure B.1: Real Housing Price and its trend
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Real Land Price Index
Constant Growth Trend
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Davis and Heathcote(2007)
This figure plots the land price index available from the Lincoln Institute of Land Pol-
icy, which is constructed following [14], using Case-Shiller National Home Price In-
dex and replacement cost of structures available from BEA. The data is available at
http://datatoolkits.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/price-and-quantity.asp. For
the constant growth trend, the growth rate of the trend is picked to match the aver-
age growth rate of real land price between 1975 and 1995.
Figure B.2: Real Land Price and its trend
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This figure illustrates the proof. I first consider the case where ξ = ξss (red dotted curve),
where ξss is such that at the unique frictionless steady state, firm’s credit constraint
holds with equality. In this case, I show that f ′(pss) > 0 and f(0) > 0. Thus there
exists multiple steady states. I then consider perturbation to ξ > ξss (blue curve) and
show that results extends.
Figure B.3: Proof
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This figure presents the timeseries of shocks I feed into the model
Figure B.4: Simulation
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The figure plots various policy functions. The top left panel plots (normalized) law of
motion for capital. Note that it is S-shaped conditional on previous period wage. The top
left panel plots equilibrium labor function. The bottom left plots equilibrium land price
function. The bottom right plots equilibrium wage function. plots of different colors are
conditional on different level of previous-period wages.
Figure B.5: Policy Functions
